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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in finding the Hallmark "note" 
enforceable and a marital debt and charging one-half to the wife? 
2. Did the trial court err in finding the vacant lot 
adjacent to the marital residence was not marital property and in 
excluding it from the marital estate? 
3. Was it error for the trial court to award only $500 of 
the $7,142.50 in attorney's fees and costs to the wife given the 
fact that the uncooperative behavior of the husband caused a 
substantial portion of those fees to be incurred? 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the arbitrary 
nature of its valuation and division of personal property? 
5. Were the trial proceedings properly conducted so as to 
result in a fair trial to the wife? 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARVILLA FINLAYSON, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 920411-CA 
Cross-Respondent, : 
v. : Priority No, 16 
ROGER FINLAYSON, : District Court 904905062DA 
Defendant/Respondent, : 
Cross-Petitioner : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLANT'S JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 78-2a-3(g) Utah Code Ann, (1953, as amended) 
This action involves the appeal of Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and a Decree of Divorce signed and entered in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
on March 31, 1992. An Order denying Plaintifffs Motion for New 
Trial was signed on May 20, 1992. A timely Notice of Appeal was 
filed on July 17, 1992. A cross appeal was filed on July 1, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves a divorce case. The parties were married 
on September 4, 1964 and separated on or about December 21, 1990. 
The parties are parents of four children, only one of which is 
under the age of 18. In December, 1991, the plaintiff, Mrs. 
Finlayson, filed a Complaint for Divorce. Subsequently the 
defendant, Mr. Finlayson, filed an Answer but did not 
counterclaim. Although the case was assigned to Judge Timothy R. 
Hanson, in his absence it was tried before the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist, retired judge. The trial was held on October 17 and 18, 
1991. The parties and other witnesses testified at the trial. At 
the conclusion of the trial, Judge Wahlquist ruled from the bench 
as to the division of marital property, custody of the parties1 
minor child, support obligations, the allocation of debt and 
attorneyfs fees. Mr. Finlayson prepared proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and a post trial 
hearing was held on Mrs. Fin]aysonfs objections on February 21, 
1992. At the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Wahlquist made 
additional findings and clarifications and the supplemental 
Findings, Conclusions and Decree were finally entered on March 31, 
1992. On April 3, 1992, Mrs., Finlayson filed a Motion for New 
Trial. Judge Wahlquist issued a written Memorandum Decision on May 
19, 1992 and an Order Denying that Motion was signed and entered on 
May 20, 1992. 
Mrs. Finlayson filed a timely Notice of Appeal on June 17, 
1992. A Notice of Cross Appeal was filed by Mr. Finlayson on July 
1, 1992. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, Mrs. Finlayson seeks the following relief on 
appeal: 
1. An order vacating the trial court's findings and 
conclusion that the "Hallmark" debt Respondent claimed was owed to 
his mother was a marital obligation and an order directing the 
trial court to modify the property distribution to reflect the 
elimination of this debt. 
2. An order vacating the trial court's findings and 
conclusions that the vacant lot next to the marital residence was 
the property of Respondent's mother and an order directing that 
this property be included as a part of the marital estate. 
3. An order awarding Appellant an additional $2,099.15 in 
attorney's fees for fees which were incurred by Appellant in 
seeking Respondent's cooperation and compliance with prior court 
orders. 
4. In the alternative, an order remanding this matter to the 
District Court for a new trial before a different trial judge. 
5. An Order awarding Appellant all of her attorney's fees 
and costs associated with this appeal and the defense of 
Respondent's cross appeal. 
6. For such other and further relief as may be appropriate. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
MARITAL HISTORY 
The parties were married on September 4, 1964, approximately 
28 years ago. They had four children (R-2) . One died during 
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childhood, two are adults and one daughter is still a minor, 
Trisha, age 16. (R-423) Approximately one year before the 
marriage, Mr. Finlayson (Roger) decided to open a Hallmark Card 
shop in a local mall. (R-493) After the marriage, both parties 
devoted all of their efforts to the success of this business until 
it was sold in June of 1985. (R-722) They both worked at the shop 
during the day with Roger keeping the books. (R-541) Mrs. 
Finlayson (Arvilla) also devoted her full time to the endeavor, as 
well as caring for the children (at the shop after school and at 
home in the evenings), and keeping a good home for Roger. (R-4 36) 
For the first five years, the parties lived in an apartment 
owned by Roger's parents and didnft pay rent. (R-58 6) Afterwards, 
they purchased a home in Salt Lake and relied on the store for 
income to pay the day to day family expenses. In 1985 they sold 
the store for $250,000.00. ($50,000.00 down and $6,000.00 per 
month on the remaining balance) (R-592, 722) Roger put the down 
payment in a local thrift and loan. (R-591, 593) Shortly 
thereafter that institution failed and to date, the parties have 
recouped about 70% of their initial deposit. (R-725) In 1988 the 
parties paid off their home. (R-499) The parties then lived off 
of the monthly store payment. Roger would direct Arvilla to put 
$3,000.00 each month in the savings account and keep $3,000.00 in 
cash, which was then kept in the safe at the marital residence. 
(R-431) Arvilla did not know very much about the family finances, 
leaving that pretty much to Roger. 
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During the marriage, the parties acquired real property, some 
investments and substantial personal property including tools and 
guns, a doll collection as well as various automobiles, a boat, a 
motor home, stock, a cash value in a life insurance policy, and 
other miscellaneous items. (See Exhibit 7-P, Addendum) 
The marriage began to deteriorate and in the first part of 
1990, Roger moved from the marital bedroom to a separate room in 
the home. (R-424) He installed a lock on the door and refused 
Arvilla access. He also began eating his meals in the room 
(R-426) and encouraged his 16 year old daughter Trisha to do 
likewise and to spend all of her time after school in the room with 
him. (R-425) In March 1990, the parties began discussing a 
possible divorce. (R-726) In early December 1990, Roger began 
removing items such as the coin collection (R-513) from the safe 
and personal property from the home. (R-727, 702) He testified 
he gave all of his tools to his son Kurt in August 1991. (R-710) 
In early December 1990, Roger also told Arvilla that she 
should get a lawyer and proceed with a divorce. (R-720) Then, 
without advising Arvilla, he withdrew the following monies from the 
parties1 savings account and paid this cash to his mother claiming 
they were payments on two loans his father had made to him in 1962 
and 1964 respectively. (R-695) 
December 11, 1990 $ 9,300.00 
December 12, 1990 9,000.00 
December 13, 1990 9,500.00 
December 14, 1990 38,985.00 
TOTAL $66,785.00 
(See Exhibit 20-D, Addendum) 
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Upon learning of what Roger was doing, Arvilla withdrew 
approximately $35,000,00 to prevent further dissipation of marital 
assets by Roger. (R-413) 
PRE-TRIAL DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS 
On December 20, 1990, Arvilla filed a Complaint for Divorce 
(R-2) and secured a restraining order against Roger which among 
other things, restrained him from further disposing of assets. (R-
23) At the January 11, 1991 Temporary Relief hearing, the parties 
were awarded joint legal custody of Trisha, but because Trisha 
wished to remain with her father, Roger received physical custody 
and use of the marital residence. (R-56) Arvilla received 
reasonable visitation. The home was to be listed for sale with 
each party to cooperate to effectuate the earliest possible sale. 
(R-63) Roger then refused to agree on an agent and listing price. 
(R-77) In March of 1991, the parties finally entered into a 
further stipulation agreeing to use Todd S. Eagar of Eagar and 
Company to list and sell the marital residence and the adjacent lot 
which the parties owned. 
Roger began to thwart visitation between Trisha and her 
mother. (R-77, 38, 452) In fact, in July of 1991 a mutually agreed 
upon custody evaluator concluded that Rogerfs actions had been 
harmful to Trisha and stated: 
It is this evaluatorfs professional opinion that Trisha 
Ann Finlayson is in danger of being seriously damaged 
emotionally and psychologically in her present living 
arrangements. She has no empathy for her motherfs 
position and has been placed in the positions of acting 
as her father's surrogate spouse. She tends to his 
illnesses, shared the problems of his divorce and 
recreates on weekends with him. She states that she 
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works hard at school for him. Both admit to having few 
friends outside the relationship. (Emphasis added) 
Trisha should be encouraged to have regular visits with 
her mother and attempt to re-establish that relationship. 
(R-116) (Emphasis added) 
As of April 30, 1991, Roger had still not listed the home and 
lot and had failed to make necessary repairs on the home to ready 
it for sale. (R-77) Even though ordered to do so in March 1991 
(R-71) he would not cooperate in listing the vacant lot until June 
1991. (R-711) 
In June of 1991, Arvilla requested a contempt citation against 
Roger for his repeated failure to comply with court orders. (R-77) 
The hearing on that request resulted in Commissioner Arnett 
recommending compliance with the previous orders. An evidentiary 
hearing in the contempt issue was to be held before Judge Hanson. 
Commissioner Arnett also reserved the issue of Arvillafs request 
for attorney's fees related to Roger's non-compliance. 
Arvilla filed a Certificate of Readiness for Trial in June 
1991, (R-86) and the matter was ultimately tried before Judge 
Wahlquist, a retired judge substituting for Judge Hanson on October 
17 and 18, 1991. 
TRIAL 
At trial, Arvilla, Roger, the parties son Kurt and Roger's 
mother, Mina Finlayson, testified. Ms. Donovan, Arvillafs counsel, 
testified by stipulated proffer as to Arvilla's fees. (R-531) Mr. 
Russell, Roger's counsel, did not cross examine Ms. Donovan nor did 
he testify as to his fees. (R-533) 
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The major issues over which there was substantial dispute 
were: 
1. How were two "notes" written by Roger to his parents in 
1962 and 1964 respectively to be treated? i.e. If 
legitimate, were these marital debts to be charged 
against the marital estate? 
2. Was a vacant lot next to the marital residence and 
transferred to the parties in 1978 with Roger as trustee 
and Roger's mother as settlor, marital property or was it 
still property of Roger's mother? 
3. How was the substantial personal property, acquired 
during the marriage, to be valued and distributed? 
4. How was Arvilla to be assured of meaningful access and 
visitation to Trisha? 
5. What amount of fees should Roger pay Arvilla because of 
his repeated failures to obey court orders? 
"Hallmark and Rent Notes" 
In 1962, two years before the parties married, Roger claimed 
his father had loaned him $14,000.00 to start the Hallmark card 
shop. He said he prepared and signed a "note" (Exhibit 18-D, 
Addendum) and gave it to his father. The "note" did not contain a 
principal amount nor a due date. It provided only that the 
unspecified amount advanced would bear interest at 6% per annum. 
Roger's mother was not present or involved in the transaction. (R-
538) Roger gave the document to his father (R-699) . His father 
died in 1969 and it was just before this divorce began that Roger 
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secured possession of the "note" from his mother (R-582). He said 
he'd forgotten about it. (R-587) Attached to the note were 
Roger's calculations as to the total amount of principal and 
interest due through trial. i.e. $71,672.13 (R-585). Roger did 
not introduce any documents reflecting the initial claimed loan (R-
696) 
Both Roger and his mother acknowledged Arvilla had no 
knowledge as to the financial details of the loan (R-541, 698) and 
in fact, they didn't want her involved. (R-558) Arvilla said she 
knew Roger had received some money from his father but didn't know 
much else. (R-444, 525) She recalled Roger's parents having a 
history of making gifts to their two sons. (R-484, 522) 
During the marriage, Arvilla had asked Roger to make certain 
that he and his mother had resolved this issue so that their 
relationship would continue to be good and Roger would tell Arvilla 
it was none of her business. (R-496) 
On September 4, 1964, the day of the parties marriage, Roger 
claimed he prepared and signed a second "note" (Exhibit 19-D 
Addendum) (R-586) and gave it to his father to repay him any rents 
which were to accrue while the parties were living in the apartment 
owned by Roger's parents. (R-586) Like the first "note", Roger 
and his mother said Arvilla was not involved. (R-558) Arvilla 
knew nothing about it (R-698); it did not surface until trial (R-
582). Attached to it were Roger's calculations that the parties 
owed a total of $49,778.33 and nothing had ever been done by 
Roger's parents to collect on it. (R-545) 
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For over 26 years nothing was paid on these "debts" and it was 
not until December 11, 1990, (ten days before this divorce action 
was filed) that Roger paid any monies to his mother on these 
"debts". (R-541) Between December 11 and 14, 1990 he withdrew a 
total of $66,785.00 from the parties savings account to "repay" 
these "debts". (R-599, 695) 
At trial, Arvilla argued that neither of these "debts" should 
be charged against the marital estate. She argued, in her Trial 
Brief, that these "debts" in any event were invalid and raised 
adequacy of terms, statute of limitations, estoppel, and fraudulent 
conveyance defenses (R-112). Roger argued that these "debts" were 
marital obligations and should be repaid to his mother and denied 
that these would ever come back to him and the sole surviving heir 
of his motherfs estate (his only brother, Roland, had died). (R-
716) 
With this evidence before it, the trial court did something 
very unusual but most erroneous. It found that the "Hallmark note" 
was a marital obligation and that Roger's mother should be repaid 
$14,800.84 in principal and $25,752.87 in interest for a total of 
$40,553.74. (R-166-167) It then found that Arvilla could avoid 
paying the "rent note" by raising the statute of limitations 
defense and did not include it as a marital obligation. (R-157) 
Vacant Lot 
In the sixties, Roger's parents acquired a vacant lot next to 
Roger's and Arvilla!s marital residence. (R-642) Evidently, 
Roger's father had wanted to build a home on the ground into which 
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he and his wife would ultimately move. (R-551) Rogerfs father died 
in 1969 (R-562) and Roger's mother elected not to go forward with 
this building plan. (R-551) The lot was then transferred into a 
Living Trust established and created by Roger's mother, Mrs. 
Finlayson, for her benefit with Roger serving as Trustee. In 1978, 
she and Roger caused a Warranty Deed to be prepared which both 
signed as grantors in their respective capacities, conveying this 
lot to Roger and Arvilla as tenants in common. (Exhibit 31-P, See 
Addendum) It was delivered and recorded at that time. (R-562, 563) 
Since 1978, Roger and Arvilla paid all of the taxes on the 
lot, (R-554, 563, 650) weeded it and maintained it. (R-650) Roger 
and his mother testified the transfer was only to allow Roger to 
sell the property. (R-650, 552) The property had never been 
listed for sale and in the last 13 years, Roger said he received 
only one offer on it. (R-651) Arvilla said she had always 
understood the lot to have been given to Roger and her by his 
mother. (R-501) The issue of ownership was raised by Roger only 
after this divorce had commenced. Arvilla claimed the lot was 
marital property. (R-457) Roger claimed it was still owned by his 
mother. (R-652) The trial court again agreed with Roger and 
ordered it excluded from the marital estate and returned to Roger's 
mother. (R-155, 156) The court relied solely on the testimony of 
Roger and his mother in making this decision. (R-293) 
Personal Property 
During the marriage the parties had acquired substantial items 
of personal property requiring valuation and division. (See 
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Exhibits 8-P, 11-P, 12-P, 26--D) Because of the problem1s Arvilla 
had with Roger while the divorce was pending, she requested that 
the court aid her in valuing and dividing this property. (R-731) 
Roger said he thought the property should be divided by "flipping 
a coin". (R-715) At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial 
court ruled from the bench and advised the parties that it was not 
going to deal with this issue other than to have his bailiff "flip 
a coin" and the party winning the "flip" could select the first 
room of furniture with this procedure to then alternate until all 
of the rooms had been selected. (R-338) 
Unnecessary Attorney's Fees 
Ms. Donovan, by agreed proffer, testified that Arvilla had 
incurred a total of $7,142.50 in attorney's fees and costs and that 
in her opinion $2,599.15 of those fees were incurred solely as a 
result of the uncooperative attitude of Roger. (R-552) She was not 
cross examined on this. With this undisputed evidence before it, 
the trial court ruled that Arvilla should receive only $500.00 
towards her fees based upon Roger's failure to cooperate in listing 
the home (R-160) and the problems he caused with visitation (R-
351) . 
POST TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 
After trial, Roger's counsel prepared proposed Findings and 
Conclusions. Arvillafs counsel objected and the trial court, at a 
hearing on those objections, supplemented the original proposed 
Findings. (R-358 to 392) 
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Arvilla then made a Motion for New Trial claiming a number of 
errors and irregularities. (R-2 05) The court issued a Memorandum 
Decision denying that Motion (R-282 to 298) and Arvilla then timely 
filed this Appeal. (R-315) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
It was correct for the trial court to conclude that the 1964 
"Rent Note" was not a legally enforceable marital obligation. It 
was incorrect for the trial court to conclude that the 1962 
"Hallmark Note" was a legally enforceable marital obligation and 
half of which was chargeable to Arvilla. It is totally unequitable 
to require Arvilla to be responsible for a 28 year old obligation 
that Roger's mother said "was none of her affair and about which 
she had little if any knowledge". 
On a strictly legal basis both notes were barred by the 
Statute of Limitations. Also under these facts Roger's parents 
were barred by the Doctrine of Laches from collecting on the debts 
and both Roger and his mother were estopped by their own conduct 
from trying to enforce these obligations against Arvilla. Finally, 
the trial court gave relief to Rogerfs mother which she could not 
have achieved by filing an action of her own. 
POINT II 
The evidence and particularly the objective evidence, 
presented to the trial court in relation to the vacant lot 
overwhelmingly supports a finding that the lot was given to Roger 
and Arvilla by Roger's mother in 1978. There was insufficient 
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evidence to support a finding that Roger and Arvilla held the 
property in trust for Roger's mother. Based on the successful 
marshalling of the evidence as is required by Arvilla, this Court 
under its equitable powers should make its own findings and order 
that this lot be included as a part of the marital estate. 
POINT III 
Arvilla incurred $7,142.50 in attorney's fees and costs 
through trial. Arvillafs attorney testified that, in her opinion, 
$2,599.15 of the fees were incurred unnecessarily because of 
Roger's failure to follow court orders and cooperate. This 
testimony was undisputed. The trial court found that Roger had 
thwarted visitation and failed to cooperate in this listing of the 
marital residence. In spite of this, the Court only awarded 
Arvilla $500.00 in attorney's fees. This minimal award when viewed 
in light of the undisputed evidence as to the amount of additional 
fees and Roger's recalcitrance constitute an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion in awarding attorney's fees. 
POINT IV 
The trial court acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in 
the way it conducted the trial, made its findings and conclusions 
and valued and divided property. In particular: 
1) The trial judge slept during portions of the trial and 
consequently "missed" important evidence. 
2) The trial judge made inconsistent findings on material 
issues not supported by the evidence. 
3) The trial court arbitrarily assigned values to property. 
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4) The trial judge ordered that personal property would be 
divided by the "flip of a coin11. 
All of the above prevented Arvilla from receiving a fair 
trial. 
POINT V 
Because Arvilla was required to appeal the trial court's 
ruling to prevent substantial injustice to her and because Roger 
will have funds available to him from his share of the home 
proceeds, Arvilla is entitled to be awarded her attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in connection with this appeal and cross appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING ARVILLA TO 
ASSUME ONE-HALF OF A 28 YEAR OLD "DEBT" WHICH 
ROGER CLAIMED HE OWED HIS MOTHER. 
At trial, Roger produced two documents which he claimed 
represented 26 and 28 year old obligations he said he owed to his 
parents. He asked the trial court to declare these to be marital 
debts which would then be paid to his mother from marital funds. 
He claimed that $71,672.13 was owed on the "Hallmark note" (R-585) 
and that $49,778.33 was owed on the "rent note" (R-589) for a total 
of $118,632.32. (R-598). A week before this action was filed, 
Roger made the four separate payments in cash on these obligations 
to his mother in the sum of $66,785.00. (R-599) He asked the 
Court to require marital funds to repay the remaining $51,847.00. 
(R-599) Arvilla claimed these were not marital obligations and 
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even if they were, they were unenforceable against she and her 
husband. 
In analyzing these respective positions, the trial court did 
a strange thing. It ruled correctly in concluding that the "rent 
note" should not be a marital obligation and that even if it was, 
the parties had valid statute of limitation defenses which would 
preclude Rogerfs mother from collecting anything from the parties. 
In so holding on the "rent note", the court found: 
The separate note from Defendant to his parents for 
rental amounts owed to them for marital housing expenses 
is held unenforceable, and additional amounts paid to 
Mina from joint marital funds shall be charged to 
Defendant as a receipt of marital funds, which 
calculations are set forth in Finding paragraph 8, above. 
The Defendants father, for reasons not fully disclosed 
in the evidence except by circumstantial inference, 
wished to maintain control of the store and may or may 
not have regarded it as a potential asset owned by 
himself. There is no fixed amount, but at the time the 
note was made, it was meant to cover inventory, and 
readily determinable by the parties, but held some 
possible dispute with creditors. There has been no 
payment on this amount, but it has been discussed 
throughout the marriage by the parties. The son should 
not be forced to plead with the statute of limitations 
against his mother. The mother holds a lien for that 
inventory as against these litigants. The court treats 
these two obligations differently because the store loan 
is attributable to the creation of marital property which 
the parties have enjoyed, but the rental loan yielded no 
asset subject to division,. With reference to the 
"monies for rent" note, this loan was made during the 
marriage, with fixed interest at six percent. It was 
intended eventually that it would be paid. There was no 
payment on it. The statute of limitations has run. The 
wife has the right to plead the statute of limitations. 
In justice and equity, she should be regarded as free of 
the debt. Payments on that debt are considered voluntary 
by Defendant, and come from his share. Accordingly, 
Defendant alone shall be responsible to discharge the 
note relating to housing expenses, holding the Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. (R-185) (Emphasis added) 
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The language emphasized above is the correct analysis as to how 
both of these "notes11 should have been dealt with. 
However, the "Hallmark note" was handled in a totally opposite 
and inconsistent way when the trial court erroneously attempted to 
create a distinction between the two notes without a difference and 
found as follows on the "note" that was signed two years before the 
"Rent note". 
Prior to the marriage, Defendant borrowed funds, in the 
amount of $14,800.84, from his parents to open a Hallmark 
store in the Cottonwood Mall, which was operated by 
Defendant prior to the marriage and by both parties 
during the marriage, and was later sold during the 
marriage. Said obligation was evidenced by a written 
promissory note, dated September 4, 1962 with stated 
interest of 6% per cent per annum, but without reference 
to simple or compound interest. While the court finds 
both parties substantially contributed to the operation 
and success of the business, the court finds that 
although the business and its proceeds were in large part 
marital property, equity requires that the originally 
borrowed set-up funds be repaid by the parties from 
marital assets. The Court also finds that without this 
loan from Defendant's parents, the parties would not have 
had the opportunity to engage in and built the business, 
and reap its benefits. Thus, Defendant's repayment of 
funds to his mother in late 1990 were properly paid by 
marital funds held in a joint savings account. The Court 
finds simple interest to be applicable, and that interest 
accrued in the amount of $888.03 per year for 29 years 
($25,752,87 total interest through trial), which, added 
to the principal amount, equals a total obligation of 
$40,553.74. Defendant made several repayments on said 
note in 1990. (R-184) 
In attempting to analyze the trial court's reasoning in making 
what is simply an inconsistent and unjustified distinction, the 
following facts should be kept in mind. 
1. Each "note" was prepared by Roger. 
2. Each "note" was signed only by Roger. 
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3. At trial, Arvilla questioned the authenticity of both 
documents after "surfacing11 some 26-28 years after the 
fact. 
4. Neither "note11 states a sum. 
5. Neither "note" has a payment date or language that it is 
payable "on demand". 
6. Roger produced no documents to substantiate he had 
received any monies from his father. (R-696) 
7. Roger's family didn't want Arvilla involved in these 
transactions. (R-541, 558, 698) 
8. No payments were made on either "note" by Roger until the 
start of this action. (R-696) 
9. No demands for payments were made by Roger's parents. 
(R-545, 586) 
10. Roger said Arvilla never really knew how much was owed. 
(R-698) 
The trial court erred in finding the "Hallmark note" to be a 
marital obligation subject to repayment to Roger's mother. The 
reason for this error is that neither "note" was a legally 
enforceable obligation against either party because both debts were 
subject to valid Statute of Limitations and "laches" defenses. In 
addition, the conduct of Roger and his mother, over the last 26 
years, amounts to an estoppel which would prevent either of them 
from recovering any amounts for these "debts" from Arvilla. 
It is well established that trial courts have considerable 
discretion in dividing marital property and allocating marital 
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debt. Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
Arvilla recognizes and acknowledges that principle. However, the 
facts of this case clearly reflect that the trial court abused that 
broad discretion in finding that the "Hallmark Note" was a "marital 
debt", one half of which was chargeable to Arvilla and for that 
matter in finding that the "debt" was an enforceable debt against 
either party. 
First, neither "note" set forth a sum certain as to what the 
obligation was or what "the debt" would ultimately be. Both Roger 
and his mother acknowledged on several occasions during their 
testimony that these loans "were none of Arvillafs business" (R-
541, 558). Arvilla was never involved in either transaction and 
Roger admitted that she was never informed of any specific amounts, 
Roger, at trial, claimed were due (R-698). 
Under these facts it was unconscionable for the trial court to 
impose responsibility on Arvilla to repay one half of a 28 year old 
"debt" about which she knew little, if anything. In addition, the 
bulk of the marital estate was limited to proceeds which would be 
generated from the sale of the parties home and vacant lot. 
Arvilla was unskilled, and by the trial court's own finding capable 
of earning only a minimum wage. She was 49 years old. Roger was 
the sole surviving child of his mother. 
For the trial court to reduce the marital estate by 
$40,533.74, the amount the trial court found to be due on the note 
after 28 years and to require that that sum be paid to Rogerfs 92 
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year old mother was patently unfair and contrary to all principles 
of equity and fairness. 
Putting equity aside for the moment, it was also an error in 
law for the Court to find the "Hallmark Note" an enforceable legal 
obligation. First, the Statute of Limitations for enforcing any 
such obligation by Roger!s mother had long run. Section 78-12-23 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) provides that any action to 
collect a debt based upon an "instrument in writing" must be 
brought within six years. Rogerfs parents never brought an action 
to collect either "note" over a 26-28 year period. The trial court 
correctly recognized that failure on the "rent note" and simply 
ignored that failure on the "Hallmark note". To do so was 
reversible legal error. 
Second, the failure of Rogerfs parents to take any action 
whatsoever to collect on these notes for this lengthy period of 
time invokes the "laches" bar prohibiting them from collecting this 
obligation from either Roger or Arvilla. In Plateau Min. v. Utah 
Division of State Lands, 802 P. 2d 720 (Utah 1990) the Court defined 
the Doctrine of Laches as follows: 
Laches bars a recovery when there has been a 
delay by one party causing a disadvantage to 
the other party. Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. 
Sucrarhouse Shopping Center Assoc. , 53 5 P. 2d 
1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). Laches has two 
elements: (1) lack of diligence on the part 
of the claimant and (2) an injury to the 
defendant because of the lack of diligence. 
Id. at 1260. 
Id. at 731. 
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Clearly, Rogerfs parents' delay in collecting the "debt" was, 
at a minimum, a lack of diligence which caused Arvilla substantial 
injury in the form of responsibility for one-half the "debt". 
Third, both Roger and his mother are estopped from seeking 
repayment of any of these monies from Arvilla. In Brixen & 
Christopher, Arch, v. Elton, 777 P.2d 1039 (Utah App. 1989) this 
Court held: 
Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which 
precludes parties from asserting their rights 
where their actions render it inequitable to 
allow them to assert those rights. Estoppel 
requires proof of three elements: (1) a 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act 
by one party inconsistent with a later 
asserted claim; (2) the other partyfs 
reasonable action or inaction based upon the 
first party's statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second 
party that would result from allowing the 
first party to contradict or repudiate the 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
Id. at 1043. See also CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, 
Inc. , 772 P.2d 967, 970 (Utah 1989); Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 
(Utah 1983) . 
The estoppel elements set out in Brixen, supra, are present in 
this case. 
1) Both Roger and his mother's testimony indicating that 
these "loans" were none of Arvillafs affairs; Roger's 
failure to pay anything on these debts until one week 
before the divorce action was filed and Roger's mother's 
failure to make any demand for payment over a 2 6 year 
period are unquestionably statements and failures to act 
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inconsistent with the claim for payment they made at 
trial. 
2) Arvilla fs assumption that no such debt existed or that 
the same had been taken care of by Roger was reasonable 
given the long passage of time, the history of gift 
giving by Roger's parents and Roger's dominance and 
control over the family finances; and, 
3) Arvilla would be damaged to the extent of over $20,000.00 
if Roger and his mother were allowed to now claim the 
"debts" are due and owing. 
Roger and his mother are estopped from claiming Arvilla is in 
any way obligated on these obligations. 
Finally, the actions of the trial court in enforcing the 
"Hallmark note" were entirely inappropriate because, in so doing, 
it allowed Roger's mother to secure legal relief from an equitable 
action to which she was not a party. Furthermore, it allowed 
Roger's mother to secure relief which could not have been obtained 
in any independent action filed by her against Roger and Arvilla 
for the same reasons set out above. 
The trial court correctly concluded that the "Rent note" was 
not a marital obligation chargeable against Arvilla. It 
incorrectly concluded that the "Hallmark note" was a marital 
obligation chargeable against Arvilla. That portion of the trial 
court's order should be vacated. 
22 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
VACANT LOT NEXT TO THE MARITAL RESIDENCE WAS 
NOT MARITAL PROPERTY AND IN REQUIRING THAT THE 
PARTIES QUIT CLAIM THEIR INTEREST IN THIS 
PROPERTY BACK TO ROGER'S MOTHER. 
In 1978 the parties received a Warranty Deed to the vacant lot 
next to the marital residence. The deed was signed by Roger as 
trustee, and his mother as settlor, and conveyed this lot to Roger 
and Arvilla as tenants in common without any reservations. 
(Exhibit 3IP - Addendum) Arvilla included this property as part of 
the marital estate. Roger claimed the property was his mother's. 
The trial court erroneously agreed with Roger and made the 
following finding. 
The Court finds that during the marriage (in 1978) Mina 
Finlayson, the Defendant's mother, and/or a trust related 
to her, deeded real property located at 4946 Highland 
Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, jointly to the parties, 
which deed was duly delivered and recorded. Said 
property is a vacant lot located adjacent to the marital 
home, and was owned by Mina Finlayson with her husband, 
who died prior to the transfer of record title. From the 
testimony of Mina Finlayson and other witnesses at trial, 
the Court finds that Mina had, at the time of the 
transfer to the parties, decided to sell the property and 
as a result, deeded the property to the parties as 
trustees, to maintain and attempt to sell the property 
for her. The Court further finds that said transfer was 
without donative intent, that no equitable interest 
passed to the parties, and that Mina!s intent was solely 
to allow the parties to act as her agents in maintaining 
and selling the lot. Marital funds were used to pay the 
property taxes for such parcel as they came due. The 
Defendant did not request reimbursement for the taxes 
from his mother because of the two note obligations owed 
to her (more fully described in Finding paragraph 13, 
below) were of a substantial nature and had not yet been 
repaid. All dealings with the property have occurred 
since the marriage. There has been perhaps six thousand 
dollars paid in taxes, but there has been no interest 
paid on any other debt. The Court regards this as a 
wash. As such, the Court finds that said real property 
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is not within the marital estate. Each of the parties 
should be ordered to execute a Quit-Claim deed in favor 
of Mina Finlayson, her successor, or her designated 
agent. (R-183-184) 
It is also well established that a party challenging any 
finding by a trial court must marshall all of the evidence in 
support of that finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
inadequate when weighed with other contrary evidence. [See Crouse 
v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah 1991).] 
The evidence the trial court relied on in support of its 
finding that the vacant lot belonged to Roger's mother was 
inadequate when considered in light of all the other evidence which 
showed that the parties, not Roger's mother, owned this lot. 
The evidence in support of the finding was: 
1. Roger's testimony that his mother never gave the lot to 
the parties. (R-642-650) 
2. Roger's mother's testimony that she never intended to 
give the lot to the parties. (R-552-555) 
3. The parties son Kurt's testimony that he thought the lot 
had not been given to the parties. (R-568) [It is 
important to remember while these proceedings were 
pending, Roger had alleged giving his son guns and all of 
his extensive collection of tools. (R-710)] 
The evidence against the finding was: 
1. The language of the Warranty Deed itself. (Exhibit 31-P 
Addendum) 
Roger W. Finlayson, Trustee of Mina W. 
Finlayson, Revocable Trust, and Mina W. 
Finlayson Settler of the Mina WK. Finlayson 
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Trust, Grantors of Salt Lake City Utah hereby 
convey and warrant to Roger W. Finlayson and 
Arvilla K. Finlayson, his wife, Grantees. . . 
(Exhibit 31-P) 
2. The fact that both Roger and his mother signed this deed. 
3. The fact that the transfer was made in 1978 - 13 years 
ago. (R-644) 
4. The fact that since the transfer, Roger and Arvilla paid 
over $6,000.00 in real estate taxes on the ground. (R-
554, 563, 650) 
5. The fact that no evidence was presented showing that 
Roger had ever listed the property for sale for his 
mother. 
6. The fact that in 13 years, Roger testified only one offer 
to purchase the lot had been received. (R-651) 
7. The fact that during the course of these proceedings, 
Roger stipulated that the vacant lot could be listed for 
sale. (R-68) 
8. The fact that Rogerfs parents throughout the years gave 
Roger money and did not request repayment. (R-54 3) 
9. The fact that Roger, as trustee for his mother, had 
complete authority to sell this property without the need 
for further conveyance in 1978. 
10. The fact that the 1978 deed was delivered to Roger and 
Arvilla and recorded shortly after delivery. 
11. The fact that the parties maintained, weeded and kept up 
the property since its transfer to them in 1978. (R-650) 
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12. The fact that the issue of ownership was brought up only 
after Arvilla had commenced this divorce against Roger. 
13. The fact that while Rogerfs father was living, there had 
been discussions of Roger's parents1 building a home on 
this lot. When he died in 1969, Rogerfs mother said she 
no longer wanted to pursue this project. (R-551) 
14. The fact that Arvilla believed she and Roger had owned 
the lot since 1976 (R-47) and that it was her 
understanding that she and Roger could sell the lot and 
keep the proceeds. (R-90, 91) 
15. The fact that Roger"s mother had had no involvement with 
the property since 1978. (R-563) 
16. The fact that Roger was the sole surviving child of his 
mother. (R-716) 
Clearly, the foregoing demonstrates objectively that the 1978 
transfer was a gift to Roger and his wife, Arvilla. The subjective 
testimony of interested parties is the only evidence which supports 
the erroneous conclusion that it was not a gift. 
In determining a grantor's intent as it relates to the making 
of a gift, it is well established that the trier of fact must 
consider all of the circumstances surrounding the making of a gift. 
[See Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 92 P.2d 465 (Utah 1939) and 
Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1924).] 
It is not sufficient to consider only the testimony of parties 
having a direct interest in either upholding or challenging the 
gift. In this case, the trial court simply ignored the objective 
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credible evidence related to this transfer and accepted the 
subjective testimony of very interested persons in finding that the 
transfer of this lot was not a gift to Roger and Arvilla. In so 
doing, the trial court excluded a significant marital asset all to 
Arvilla's detriment. 
It is a well established principle of appellate law that an 
appellate court, in an equitable action such as divorce, can review 
de novo all of the evidence presented at trial and make its own 
findings and conclusions if it chooses to do so and if equity and 
justice require. [See Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978) 
and Wall v. Wall, 700 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1985).] 
The Findings and Conclusions of the trial court related to the 
lot should be vacated. All the evidence related to the vacant lot 
should be reviewed by this Court and this Court should enter its 
own findings to prevent a substantial injustice to Arvilla in 
eliminating this substantial asset from the marital estate. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ARVILLA ONLY 
$500.00 OF THE $7,142.50 IN ATTORNEYS FEES 
AND COSTS REQUESTED WHEN ROGERSfS ACTIONS/ 
INACTIONS CAUSED HER TO INCUR A SUBSTANTIAL 
PORTION OF THOSE FEES. 
When a party to a divorce action acts or fails to act in such 
a way as to cause the other party to incur unnecessary attorney's 
fees, it is most appropriate and permissible for the trial court to 
require the recalcitrant party to reimburse the other those 
additional fees. [See Porco v Porco 752 P. 20 at 368 (Utah App. 
1988) ] 
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For a court not to require such reimbursement allows the 
uncooperative party to unfairly take advantage of the other party. 
Such an approach sends a clear message to the offending party that 
such tactics and behaviour are permissible without fear of 
sanction. 
In this case, the record is filled with incidents of Roger's 
behavior demonstrating lack of respect for the principles of 
fairness, orders of the court and the judicial process. For 
example; 
1. Just before the divorce was filed, he withdrew over 
$66,000.00 from the parties joint bank account (R-695), 
removed items from the safe and property from the home, 
requiring Arvilla to secure a Restraining Order. (R-22) 
2. He attempted to manipulate his daughter to cause her to 
be alienated from her mother. (R-77, 452, 38, 351) 
3. He would not cooperate in the listing of the marital 
residence and lot. (R-77, 160) 
4. He would not repair the house and make it ready for sale. 
(R-77, 458) 
5. He would not cooperate in encouraging visitation. (R-
707) 
6. Even after trial, he continued to resist selling the 
house; wouldn't repair it and make it ready for sale; he 
wouldn't transfer titles to vehicles; he refused to 
cooperate in selecting a family counsellor to work with 
the parties daughter; and he continued to be 
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uncooperative in dividing personal property and in 
refusing to execute documents necessary to divide the 
parties stock, all as he was ordered to by the court. (R-
174-180) 
During the trial, Arvilla testified extensively about the 
problems she had encountered in getting cooperation from Roger. 
(R-429, 448, 452, 458, 460, 492, 727, 731) Arvilla's attorney, in 
testifying as to fees requested, substantiated her client's 
testimony and introduced a Request for Fees (Exhibit 16-P, 
Addendum) and backup documents (Exhibit 17-P, Addendum) which 
reflected what Ms. Donovan concluded were $2,599.15 in unnecessary 
fees caused by Roger's actions. Ms. Donovan's testimony in that 
regard was not challenged. (R-53) 
Even Roger admitted that he had been "hard headed and 
prolonged the case11 (R-690) and that he really didn't want to 
immediately sell the home. (R-711-712). Roger's attorney in his 
closing admitted his client had been obstinate. (R-746) 
With all of this evidence before it, the trial court in its 
ruling from the bench stated: 
The Court believes there has been unnecessary 
proceedings brought on by his failure to let her 
see the child and this type of thing, so that he 
must make a contribution of $500.00 to her fees 
because of those items. (R-351) 
In its Findings the trial court stated: 
Defendant should be ordered to pay plaintiff's 
attorney's fees in the sum of $500 and the same 
should be awarded due to legal expenses incurred in 
pursing the sale of the home and other issues . . . 
(R-160) 
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And, finally, in its Memorandum Decision denying Arvilla's 
Motion for New Trial, the trial court again noted this 
recalcitrance when it stated: 
In fact, the evidence was strong that he frequently 
did not carry out intentions . . . his or other 
people fs as for example the sale of the house as 
ordered by the Court. (R-293) (Emphasis added) 
While the trial court recognized Roger's noncompliance, the 
fee award it made was wholly inadequate given the uncontroverted 
evidence of the additional unnecessary fees and the fact that Roger 
would have the financial means available to pay those fees from his 
share of the home proceeds when the home was sold. 
Arvilla should be awarded an additional $2,099.15 in 
attorney's fees for the additional, unnecessary legal fees Roger 
caused her to incur. This sum reflects a $500.00 credit for the 
initial award of fees which the trial court made. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS MANNER IN THE WAY IT CONDUCTED THE 
TRIAL, MADE ITS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS AND 
ORDERED THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTED, CONSEQUENTLY 
DEPRIVING ARVILLA OF THE COMPLETE, FAIR AND 
IMPARTIAL TRAIL TO WHICH SHE WAS ENTITLED. 
Arvilla requests this Court to consider the relief requested 
in this Point IV only if this Court decides not to grant the relief 
she has requested in Points I, II and V of this Brief. 
The record in this case is substantial, in part due to Roger fs 
failure to comply with court orders, but also in part due to the 
way the trial judge conducted the trial, and made his findings and 
final orders. 
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Following the trial court's ruling from the bench and entry of 
Findings and Decree, Arvilla made a Motion for New Trial. (R-605) 
One of the reasons for requesting a new trial was the fact that the 
trial judge had slept during portions of the trial which involved 
witness testimony. (R-187) That claim was supported by an 
affidavit filed by Sara Ryan (R-200) a person who sat in the 
courtroom throughout the trial. Roger filed a counter affidavit 
claiming the judge did not sleep. (R-264) 
The judge in responding to this allegation in his Memorandum 
Decision (R-282) didn't deny that he may have slept but stated "I 
do not recall sleeping on this case.11 (R-282) He then goes on to 
state that he felt he hadn't "missed" anything, and concludes by 
stating "The contest was joined but there was very littl (sic) 
conflict in the testimony on the major issues." (R-282-283) 
The record reflects otherwise. For example, Roger testified 
he prepared the "two" notes, (Exhibits 18-D and 19-D) and that all 
of the handwriting on the "notes" was his. (R-170) Judge 
Wahlquist, in his Memorandum Decision denying the Motion for New 
Trial, states in relation to the "Hallmark note" that, 
"This note is written in the handwriting of the 
father, who has been dead for many years. (R-
291) 
He also states: 
"The father was worried about losing the money if 
the new venture failed so he wrote out a note which 
was signed by the son . . . (R-291) 
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Unfortunately, no such evidence exists in the record and if 
the court was in error on such a significant issue, this error 
alone is grounds for a new trial. 
The trial court also acted in a most arbitrary and capricious 
way in the manner it arrived at values of certain items of property 
and in the way it ordered them divided. Arvilla has included in 
the Addendum to this Brief, a complete transcript of the Judge's 
Ruling from the Bench and his Memorandum Decision denying the 
Motion for New Trial. (R-322-355) Arvilla respectfully urges this 
Court to read those documents in their entirety to gain the full 
impact as to how the trial courtfs final decision was reached. 
(This Court's attention is also directed to the transcript of the 
hearing on Arvilla's Objection's to Findings (R-356-392) for 
further examples of the capriciousness and arbitrariness of the 
trial court's method of resolving this case.) 
For example, during the ruling, the issue of the value of a 
diamond not mentioned during testimony was raised. Neither party 
knew what it was worth. To resolve that, the court stated: 
THE COURT: just an arbitrary point, per se, the 
diamond is worth $250.00, and she has to take it 
unless he offers her more within 24 hours. She has 
to take it at two fifty unless he bids more, then 
it will go to the highest bidder. (R-332) 
Arvilla testified of her concerns about being able to divide 
up the personal property because of the uncooperative attitude 
demonstrated by her husband. (R-731) Both parties submitted lists 
requesting that each be awarded certain items of property. 
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(Exhibits 8-P, 11-P, 12-P and 26-D) In spite of this, the trial 
judge ordered the personal property issue resolved as follows: 
THE COURT: Suppose I do it this way: We'll have a throw 
of a coin. One of you choose one room, and another 
choose another room until I've run out of rooms, and 
that's the was the division is. The furniture — be 
ready to play that way. 
MS. DONOVAN: Each party select a room, and takes all the 
furniture in that room? 
THE COURT: I'm going to start this action in a minute. 
I'm going to throw up a coin, and have defense counsel 
throw the coin. Plaintiff's counsel call heads or tails. 
If she's correct in her call, then she makes a choice for 
her client — the first choice of room. Then it will be 
the defendant's choice, and the plaintiff's choice, and 
then the defendant's choice until I run out of rooms. 
And then I'll count the garage as one room. But the 
tools are already gone. You understand what we're going 
to do? 
MS. DONOVAN: I think so, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You've got the rules? 
MS. DONOVAN: I think I've got the rules. 
MR. RUSSELL: I think I'm with her. 
MS. DONOVAN: You're including the garage? 
THE COURT: You're not excluding the garage. The garage 
counts on the end, but the tools are gone. 
The flippancy of the trial court regarding dividing personal 
property is clearly demonstrated by the trial court's statement in 
response to Mr. Russell's question about dividing items such as the 
fireplace insert, utility trailer, cement mixer, riding lawnmower, 
mulcher, snowblower and canoe, when Judge Wahlquist said, 
"You can work that out on your picnic." (R-345) 
(Emphasis added.) 
33 
These litigants were entitled to better treatment than what 
was afforded them by the trial court in relation to an issue which 
was important to both of them. The record on its face reflects an 
inattentive trial judge who acted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner in rendering his decision and without question provides 
grounds for a new trial. 
As stated at the beginning of this Point, if Arvilla is not 
granted the relief she has requested in Points I, II and V of this 
Brief, then she requests she be granted a new trial before a 
different judge. 
POINT V 
ARVILLA IS ENTITLED TO BE AWARDED THE 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS INCURRED BY HER IN 
THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS APPEAL AND THE DEFENSE 
OF ROGER'S CROSS APPEAL. 
Section 30-3-3 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) is the 
statutory basis for an award of attorney's fees in divorce actions. 
It states that: 
The Court may order either party to pay to the 
clerk a sum of money . . . to enable such 
party (adverse) to prosecute or defend the 
action. 
Id. (Parenthetical language and emphasis added) 
This section has been interpreted to apply to attorney's fees 
incurred both at the trial and appellate levels. See Dahlberg v. 
Dahlbercr, 77 Utah 157, 292 P.214 (1930) Carter v. Carter, 584, 
P.2d 904 (Utah 1978) and Maughan v Mauqhan, 770 P.2d 162 (Ut. App. 
1989) . 
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Clearly, the statute gives this Court the authority to award 
Arvilla her attorney's fees to allow her to "prosecute" the appeal 
to a successful resolution in her favor and also to allow her to 
"defend" Roger's cross appeal. 
This Court has also consistently held that a party to a 
divorce action who is successful on an appeal, is entitled to an 
award of attorneyfs fees and costs incurred in connection with 
maintaining the appeal. (See Crouse v Crouse, 817 P. 2d 839 (Ut. 
App. 1991) 
Points I, II, III and IV of this brief clearly demonstrate 
that the trial court committed significant errors in accepting the 
positions argued by Roger in connection with treating the Hallmark 
"note" as marital debt; in excluding the undeveloped lot as marital 
property; in failing to award appropriate attorneyfs fees, and in 
arbitrarily dividing and valuing the personal property. In so 
ordering, the trial court substantially diminished the marital 
estate so as to give Arvilla no other alternative than to appeal to 
this Court to correct these inequities. 
This Court should award Arvilla all of her attorneyfs fees and 
costs related to pursuing this appeal and defending Arvillafs cross 
appeal and the matter should be remanded to the trial court before 
a different judge for a determination of the same and entry of an 
appropriate judgment against Roger. 
CONCLUSION 
It is always most unfortunate for parties to endure the 
emotional and financial trauma of divorce. It is even more 
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unfortunate when one of the spouses to a divorce action attempts 
not only to protect his/her rights, but overreaches in an attempt 
to achieve a resolution unfairly weighted in his/her favor. Such 
was the case in this matter. 
The record reflects that Roger continually failed to cooperate 
with the directives of the Court. He attempted to taint the 
relationship between Arvilla and her daughter; he thwarted 
visitation, and he would not cooperate in the listing, sale and 
repair of the marital residence and adjacent lot. 
The record also demonstrates that Roger tried to "cut the 
pattern to fit the cloth" so that he would ultimately end up with 
the lion's share of what these parties had jointly worked for 
during their 27 year marriage. He resurrected 26 year old plus 
obligations he claimed were owed to his mother; he claimed a lot 
given to Arvilla and him over 13 years ago really wasn't a gift but 
rather was property of his mother; he gave marital property away; 
and incredibly, he asked the court to award him alimony and require 
Arvilla to pay him $15,751.00 in property settlement. (R-687) 
Perhaps the flavor of Roger's attitude and actions can best be 
captured in reviewing the most perceptive comment made by Ms. 
Donovan in her closing argument: 
I think the court can see what's happening. 
By the time we're through with this case 
there's no property left. Either his mother 
owns it, his son owns it, or he's given it 
away, or he's taken it out of the estate. 
That's not fair after a twenty-seven year 
marriage. (R-740) 
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It was the trial court's duty to recognize that the position 
urged by Roger was not fair to both parties. The trial court did 
not fulfill that duty when it required the "Hallmark note" to be 
paid from marital funds; ordered the vacant lot transferred back to 
Roger's mother and failed to require Roger to reimburse Arvilla for 
all of the unnecessary attorney's fees Roger caused her to incur. 
Arvilla respectfully requests this Court to correct the errors 
of the trial court and grant her the relief requested on page seven 
of this brief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of December, 1992. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Kent M. Kas t ingVdf <£dilnsel ^ - ^ 
Sharon A. Donovan 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 October 18, 1991 
3 THE COURT: The court's going to attempt to 
4 render a decision on most items now. It may be that 
5 there will be some items that will not be covered. I 
6 want to do it while the attorneys are here. Please keep 
7 your record, and I'll ask the clerk to keep the record, 
8 and you can keep the record too, and that is of the money 
9 value of the various items as they are awarded to one 
10 party or another. Get your pencil and paper on that, and 
11 we'll start on that in just a minute. 
12 First of all, on the basic issues, the court finds 
13 that the parties were married at the time alleged, and 
14 did have the children they agreed they had. The court 
15 finds that there are irreconcilable differences between 
16 the two that makes it impossible for the marriage to 
17 continue in a happy state. Therefore, the court will 
18 dissolve the marriage on the basis of irreconcilable 
19 differences. 
20 I do not, in making this judgment, blame one more 
21 than the other. I do not believe the evidence has faced 
22 that issue, and it has not been tried. The issue that's 
23 been tried is only the issue of whether or not the 
24 parties can restore the marriage. The court answers that 
25 question no. 
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1 As far as the child is concerned, court considers 
2 the evaluation that's in the file, and admissible before 
3 the court pursuant to stipulation, depicts a child that 
4 probably has considerable, serious problems. The 
5 recommendation made there is that the child's custody, 
6 physical custody be awarded to the father. The court 
7 accepts this, and that's the only reasonable alternative 
8 before the court at this time. The mother should have a 
9 right of reasonable visitation. If she desires to do, 
10 she may also send another person to visit for her, such 
11 as sending a son over to contact her, or something of 
12 this sort, or perhaps getting the son to go with her, or 
13 something of this nature so that perhaps there will be 
14 some contact. He must not interfere if she sends a third 
15 person in her stead to see the child. He must honor the 
16 substitute, and — because of the hard feelings. I don't 
17 want to necessarily throw all this on the back of the 
18 other brothers and sisters, but I think they might be 
19 useful somewhat in the situation. 
20 Court recognizes peculiarities that are here present 
21 such as the girl going to the — fifteen year old 
22 daughter going to a father's bedroom, and this type of 
23 thing. As far as the investigator could find, there is 
24 no reason, or unusual concern, and the court has seen 
25 none in this courtroom. The court will assume that it is 
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1 not a problem of unusual concern. 
2 As far as the property is concerned, the first item 
3 — the first thing the court wants to say is this: As 
4 far as the earning power of the two parties is concerned, 
5 the court finds that the plaintiff is a very personal 
6 lady of about forty-seven. She would be readily 
7 employable as a clerk, or other person who has to meet 
8 the public. The court accepts that she does have a 
9 learning disability that she's here described. And that 
10 this would limit her employment some. Court does believe 
11 that she should be charged with an earning capacity at 
12 least the minimum wage. 
13 The court's heard the testimony about his earning 
14 capacity and this type of thing. The court finds that if 
15 encouraged to not work, he will not work. If encouraged 
16 to work, he could work if he had to. The court finds 
17 that he is like a lot of men his age. When he gets 
18 older, he'll find more and more of his friends will have 
19 medical problems. To work will give him a great deal of 
20 pain and suffering, and but he's still capable of doing 
21 that. Now, he has great skills, and can do many things. 
22 However, the court believes he will have considerable 
23 absenteeism, and as a result of that will probably work 
24 close to the minimum wage level. The court will assess 
25 earning capacity against him at the minimum wage at this 
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2 The child support can be calculated on the basis 
3 here stated. As far as the assets are concerned, court 
4 recognizes that where the two parties have as close to 
5 equal earning capacity as they have as they appear before 
6 me today, that there should probably be no alimony either 
7 way. Each party is required to face the world, and do 
8 the best they can. Court awards no alimony to either 
9 side. Court also in considering these matters concludes 
10 that basically the law of the State of Utah is that all 
11 properties that are accumulated of value after marriage, 
12 unless there's a reason to view them as otherwise, are 
13 community property. And in a situation, divorce of this 
14 nature, should be divided equally, or as near equally as 
15 practical. What the court is about to do is intended by 
16 the court to be an approximate equality. And the court 
17 recognizes that exact equality is almost impossible. An 
18 article that might be, for instance clothing. If I were 
19 to award her his clothing would be to throw them away, 
20 and vice versa. There are many things that are of value 
21 to one or not valuable to the other at all, are valuable 
22 in different states. That doesn't mean I don't have to 
23 give it to one side, and charge that side with the 
24 property, and I must do this. The equation on the bottom 
25 line is not going to be equal. Court recognizes that. 
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1 And all this is some type of an equitable effort to do 
2 that. Nothing more. 
3 First of all, the store. He had the store before 
4 the marriage. The store had a debt on it before the 
5 marriage. Per se this is not community property. The 
6 store basically is his store. However, the store has 
7 changed its character grossly while the marriage has been 
8 in place, and has probably grown in value, perhaps ten 
9 times. Part of this is pure inflation, but part of it is 
10 just the fact that they must have done reasonably well at 
11 the store, or it would never have sold for what it sold 
12 for. Court believes it should be treated as community 
13 property except the debt against it must be recognized, 
14 and accepted. The court believes that the exhibit that's 
15 been presented is a valid one, and was written on 
16 approximately the date there indicated. Court notes that 
17 the interest — the $14,008.84, court notes that it 
18 states six percent interest. It says nothing about 
19 compounding or interest on interest. Inasmuch as the 
20 court does not favor in family dealings, particularly 
21 implication that compound interest is intended, the court 
22 will accept this instrument as non-compounding. This 
23 means this debt in reality is the $14,800.54, and that 
24 the interest six percent on it is $840.51, and that would 
25 be assessible each year then on. 
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1 MR. RUSSELL: I didn't hear the last figure. 
2 THE COURT: I'm using his calculations, and 
3 his calculation is that the first year's interst was 
4 $840.51. Using this theory, that — the debt would grow 
5 that much each year. But there's no interest on interest 
6 per se. Do you both follow me on that? 
7 MS. DONOVAN: Are you saying, Your Honor, 
8 that the interest each year is $841.51, so we multiply 
9 that times the number of years that are supposedly due 
10 and owing, and that's the amount you're claiming is due 
11 and owing to Mina Finlayson? 
12 THE COURT: Yes. This is I believe 
13 interpreted in family dealings, where there's no 
14 discussion of compound interest in the debt. You can 
15 figure that out quickly if you'd like. 
16 We go next to the issue of the lot next door. Court 
17 does not interpret this property to be marital property. 
18 The court does this for two reasons. The first of all, 
19 the court believes that the preponderance of the evidence 
20 is that he was given it as trustee to take care of it for 
21 his mother. However, if for any reason that failed, then 
22 the court could say that the next alternative that the 
23 court is faced with is he has been given the property as 
24 an advancement on his inheritance. Neither way does it 
25 become community property. The court deems it is not 
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1 community. Insofar as the house is concerned, court 
2 deems the house to have been purchased, so far as I can 
3 tell, while they were together- It's been paid for while 
4 they were together. It is full community property. The 
5 so-called debt for rent, $190.00 a month, the court 
6 believes that the statute of limitations has run during 
7 this period, and that in estoppels also, there's been a 
8 sleeping on rights which come into play. Court says in 
9 effect it's an affirmative defense, and he can waive it 
10 if he wants to, but he can waive it only for himself when 
11 he is no longer acting in concert with his wife. He 
12 cannot waive it for her. Any payment he makes on that 
13 debt is chargeable to his side, not her side. There a 
14 question about what I'm saying? 
15 MS. DONOVAN: I don't understand what you're 
16 saying, Your Honor. On the rent, you're saying that the 
17 statute of limitations has run on the rent? 
18 THE COURT: Yes. That's the $190.00 a month 
19 for the first five years the marriage, no enforcement has 
20 been seriously made since that time. The court believes 
21 that that is — that there's been a sleeping on rights, 
22 so that it's not enforceable. And if it were, and if he 
23 has waived it, he can waive it for himself, but he is no 
24 longer by the time that occurs her agent. Clearly not 
25 so. He cannot in equity waive her rights. So I deem any 
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1 payment he makes on that debt comes out of his share. Do 
2 you both understand what I've said? 
3 MS. DONOVAN: I'm not quite sure. Are you 
4 saying that there's no obligation to pay any rent, but if 
5 he does, that's his own? 
6 THE COURT: I say there was an obligation to 
7 pay the rent years and years ago. Such a thing existed. 
8 But there was no effort to enforce it, and both through 
9 the statute of limitations, as well as estoppel, she 
10 could defend against her mother-in-law. If he chooses 
11 not to defend, by the time he made this choice, he was 
12 not her agent. He's waived it on his own. He still owes 
13 his mother the money, but he can't waive it and bind his 
14 wife. 
15 MR. RUSSELL: Your Honor, just so I 
16 understand, what I perceive that the court is ruling is 
17 that Mr. Finlayson does not get any credits against use 
18 of marital property for the payment on that particular 
19 debt? 
20 THE COURT: That's true. 
21 MR. RUSSELL: Is that understood? 
22 MS. DONOVAN: Yeah, I think I understand 
23 that. 
24 MR. RUSSELL: Understand, Your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Now, we get -- that was the 
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1 larger items. Now we get down to the house sale. The 
2 house, it is true he's in the house, and he's in the 
3 house with the girl. The court has mixed emotions about 
4 how this must best be handled as far as empathy for the 
5 child, and the other circumstances that are present. The 
6 court believes that after the first of the year, for 
7 every month that the house is not sold, that he — she 
8 gets the first $400.00 off the sale in rents. Both of 
9 you understand what I'm saying? 
10 MS. DONOVAN: Yes, Your Honor. 
11 MR. RUSSELL: Your Honor, she accrues $400.00 
12 as a credit on the proceeds for every month after 
13 December of this year? 
14 THE COURT: Yes. At the end of December — 
15 start the first of January, if he still hasn't sold it, 
16 she starts getting $400.00 off the top. If it is not 
17 sold in six months from then, she has a right to petition 
18 the court to occupy the house, and proceed to sell it. 
19 MR. RUSSELL: June 30th, Your Honor? 
20 THE COURT: Right now. I don't know much 
21 about Salt Lake. If they were in the northern end of the 
22 State, they could not demand a sale in less than six 
23 months. Do you follow me what I'm saying? 
24 MS. DONOVAN: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: We have to understand the rules 
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1 on this. 
2 MR. RUSSELL: Six months after the first of 
3 the year, she may petition the court to regain 
4 possession. 
5 THE COURT: No. She might petition for the 
6 right to take the house, start getting this $400.00 a 
7 month. 
8 MS. DONOVAN: Is that six months from now, or 
9 
10 THE COURT: Six months from the first of the 
11 year. He really needs to do these repairs that he's been 
12 told. He's got the intelligence. He will not be able to 
13 hold that house against his wife's interests, absent some 
14 type of a rent, or agreement, such as the $400.00 figure. 
15 Now, we've come do what appears to be an impossible 
16 number of private things. First of all, each party has 
17 their own clothing. He gets the male jewelry, and she 
18 gets the female jewelry. I understand they've got one 
19 loose diamond; is that right? 
20 MR. RUSSELL: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: What do you say that diamond is 
22 worth? 
23 MR. RUSSELL: We haven't appraised it, Judge. 
24 THE COURT: What do you say it's worth? 
25 MS. FINLAYSON: I don't have -- I don't know. 
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1 THE COURT: How many karats is it? Or what 
2 part of a karat? 
3 MS. FINLAYSON: I only know that was the 
4 first diamond, but it was a small one, but what size it 
5 was, I have no answer. I only know that the one that I 
6 do have now — 
7 THE COURT: Otherwise they are going to 
8 divide the jewelry on a male female basis. Do I have 
9 trouble with anything but the one diamond? 
10 MR. RUSSELL: With the exception of that one 
11 diamond, I believe it's been divided. 
12 THE COURT: Court, just an arbitrary point 
13 per se, the diamond is worth $250.00, and she has to take 
14 it be unless he offers more within twenty-four hours. 
15 She has to take it at two fifty unless he bids more. 
16 Then it will go to the highest bidder. 
17 Now, the dolls, the court believes that the dolls 
18 are something if I give him he'll merely sell them, and 
19 they will decrease in value where they might have more 
20 value to her. The court grants her the dolls, fixs their 
21 value in the neighborhood a thousand dollars. So far as 
22 the guns, the court award each side possession of the 
23 guns they have, and fix the guns in his favor at a 
24 thousand dollars. 
25 Court comes to the tools. When I say tools, I mean 
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1 outdoor working for gardening and et cetera, or for 
2 automobiles, or for guns. These are the tools. He has 
3 to take them. He's got to make peace with his son. 
4 However the court is aware that we have some things such 
5 as the lathe to the effect that the lathe on a secondhand 
6 basis is worth in the vicinity of a thousand dollars, and 
7 he's got to make his own peace with the son. 
8 MR. RUSSELL: Your Honor, is the one thousand 
9 dollars, is that an aggregate value? 
10 THE COURT: That's what I'm counting on, but 
11 he's got to take it. If she takes it, she'll end up 
12 auctioning it. She'll be lucky if she gets $600.00 for 
13 it. At least I'm fearful that she will. 
14 We come now to furniture. I looked at this list of 
15 furniture, and it is true in the eyes of the law, 
16 furniture per se that he had before he got married would 
17 be his. Except if they are kept and used can in 
18 connection with the total home atmosphere, they can loose 
19 character. What does each say about these furniture 
20 items which he had without question before he got 
21 married? What do you say? Do you say they are his? Or 
22 does — if you live twenty-seven years in a house with a 
23 woman then they are partly hers? 
24 MR. RUSSELL: Your Honor, I think that they 
25 don't loose their character, because there are several 
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1 rooms in the house with various degrees of usage, and 
• 2 some of those rooms have to be susceptible for storage of 
3 those items. 
4 THE COURT: What could you say on this 
5 question, the items which he's listed as owning before 
6 the start? 
7 MS. DONOVAN: Your Honor, there are certain 
8 items we don't care about, and we're not going to argue 
9 about. But from a legal theory, I think after 
10 twenty-seven years, things that are in dispute probably 
11 merge. And to try and figure out exactly what he owns, 
12 or she owned, or whatever, I think is a very difficult 
13 task. 
14 MR. RUSSELL: I agree it would be extremely 
15 difficult, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: How many chairs and things of 
17 this nature are there that he claims have been in the 
18 family for forty years? 
19 MR. RUSSELL: All I can refer to is the 
20 handwritten list that he made out. 
21 THE COURT: Suppose I do it this way: We'll 
22 have a throw of a coin. One of you choose one room, and 
23 another choose another room until I've run out of the 
24 rooms, and that's the way the division is. The furniture 
25 — be ready to play that way. 
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1 1 MS. DONOVAN: Each party select a room, and 
2 takes all the furniture in that room? 
3 THE COURT: I'm going to start this action in 
4 a minute. I'm going to throw up a coin, and have defense 
5 counsel throw the coin. Plaintiff's counsel call heads 
6 or tails. If she's correct in her call, then she makes a 
7 choice for her client —the first choice of room. Then 
8 it will be the defendant's choice, and the plaintiff's 
9 choice, and then the defendant's choice until I run out 
10 of rooms. And then I'll count the garage as one room. 
11 But the tools are already gone. You understand what 
12 we're going to do? 
13 MS. DONOVAN: I think so, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: You've got the rules? 
15 MS. DONOVAN: I think I've got the rules. 
16 MR. RUSSELL: I think I'm with her. 
17 MS. DONOVAN: You're including the garage? 
18 THE COURT: You're not excluding the garage. 
19 The garage counts on the end, but the tools are gone. 
20 MS. DONOVAN: You're giving all the tools to 
21 Mr. Finlayson. 
22 THE COURT: He gets all the tools, but he's 
23 got to make some kind of peace with Kurt. I think he's 
24 told Kurt he owns all the tools. 
25 MS. DONOVAN: He's given everything to Kurt. 
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1 THE COURT: I think the tools are his. All 
2 right. I'll have the baliff throw the coin. Plaintiff's 
3 counsel call it, unless defense attorney wants to throw 
4 it. 
5 MR. RUSSELL: No. No. Baliff is fine. 
6 Your Honor, if I might just see if we can resolve 
7 something in this area — 
8 THE COURT: If you want to go out to the 
9 house, I don't know whether you need a baliff to referee 
10 or not, but otherwise I'm going to divide by lot from 
11 here on down. I'll divide cars in a minute. 
12 MR. RUSSELL: Your Honor, can we have two 
13 minutes to talk about this, Judge? 
14 THE COURT: Let me take cars, first, and then 
15 I'll go away. 
16 MR. RUSSELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Is it my understanding that she 
18 generally drives the Accord? 
19 MS. FINLAYSON: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: And is it my understanding that 
21 he generally drives the jeep? Okay. You've each got the 
22 car you generally drive. I believe that he will make 
23 better use, and get more money out of the Dodge van. 
24 I'll give it to him, assign it's value at $500.00. The 
25 dune buggy, court will assign it to him, an assess its 
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1 value at only $300.00. If she wants it, she must bid now 
2 more than four hundred today. Does she wasn't to let it 
3 go for that figure, or does she wasn't to take it? 
4 MS. DONOVAN: We'll let it go, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Come to the mobile home. She's 
6 put a very high value on it; is that true? What is her 
7 value? 
8 MS. DONOVAN: It was based upon an appraisal 
9 that she said. 
10 THE COURT: What do you say it's worth? What 
11 are you bidding on it? 
12 MS. DONOVAN: The appraisal was between ten 
13 and twelve. They've come up with a number of appraisals 
14 saying it's like three or four. 
15 THE COURT: What do you say it's worth? 
16 MR. RUSSELL: Between thirty-six and $3,900. 
17 We got four appraisals in that range. 
18 THE COURT: She can have it at ten thousand. 
19 Put her down for ten thousand. 
20 Court will be in recess for five minutes while you 
21 people talk about tomato catsup and the dishes. I would 
22 urge you make some kind of a division so that they both 
23 end up in the capacity to keep house. 
24 MR. RUSSELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Court is in recess until called. 
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1 (a recess was taken) 
2 THE COURT: Have you made any progress? 
3 MS. DONOVAN: We're getting closer, Your 
4 Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Let's talk about how closer. 
6 MR. RUSSELL: Judge, I think that Ms. Donovan 
7 and I, rather than flip a coin, and use the lists of 
8 personal property, Your Honor, would prefer to set some 
9 rules, and go out to the residence where we've got 
10 physical, tangible things to pick up and look at to do 
11 this, and we have a good enough professional relationship 
12 that I think we can maintain, and do it more officially 
13 than the court can by using these lists. 
14 THE COURT: You need the baliff with you, or 
15 just the two of you? 
16 MS. DONOVAN: I don't think so. 
17 MR. RUSSELL: We did this before with the 
18 previous counsel, Your Honor, so the four of us — the 
19 three of us, and previous counsel have done the 
20 inventory. 
21 THE COURT: Have you got these figures that 
22 you got running? 
23 MR. RUSSELL: We've got your figures, Judge, 
24 and what I think we need to do is to continue with that 
25 through the motorcycles, and the boat on what I call the 
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1 big ticket items, and then have the court give us its 
2 ruling as to the intangible personal properties, the life 
3 insurance, the Putnam Fund. 
4 THE COURT: What I try and do is use this so 
5 that when I got to the bottom line I've got equality. 
6 Some of you will have some types of things you'd rather 
7 do with others. Here's your chance. Otherwise — 
8 MR. RUSSELL: I'm sorry, I don't understand 
9 what the court has said. 
10 THE COURT: I don't rule who owns those 
11 things. All I care about is how much they are worth. 
12 MS. DONOVAN: There are some items that we're 
13 asking as to the court's value. 
14 THE COURT: If you want me to set values on 
15 it, I can do it, but — and then you can go out and count 
16 them for bid purposes. 
17 MR. RUSSELL: I guess that's what we need is 
18 values on the motorcycles, and the boat, and a ruling on 
19 the — 
20 THE COURT: The ruling usually used is this: 
21 That the party who listed is as the most valuable ends up 
22 having to take it at that value. 
23 MR. RUSSELL: All right. 
24 THE COURT: Do you understand what I'm 
25 saying? 
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1 MR, RUSSELL: Yes, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: When they are not highly 
3 personalized things. 
4 MR. RUSSELL: All right. Your Honor, we 
5 didn't ever get values on the Honda and the Jeep. 
6 THE COURT: On the Jeep? 
7 MR. RUSSELL: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: On the car? The car I think is 
9 worth — I think the car and the Jeep, I'm equating that, 
10 about seventy-four five. 
11 MR. RUSSELL: The car and the jeep are 
12 seventy-four five? 
13 MS. DONOVAN: You're saying they are of equal 
14 value? 
15 THE COURT: Roughly. 
16 MS. DONOVAN: I'm not clear. Are you saying 
17 the Honda Accord and the Jeep Wagoneer are worth how 
18 much? 
19 THE COURT: $7,450.00 each. I understand 
20 that some of you value them higher than that, some of 
21 them lower. 
22 MR. RUSSELL: All right. I understand. I 
23 missed that point. 
24 MS. DONOVAN: What about the hondas, all 
25 those motorcycles, Your Honor? 
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1 THE COURT: You want me to fix the 
2 motorcycles for you? I take it '78 750 you both valued 
3 at three hundred; is that true? 
4 MS. DONOVAN: Yes. 
5 MR. RUSSELL: That's an agreed value, Your 
6 Honor. 
7 THE COURT: The '85 Honda 700, court will set 
8 the value at eighteen hundred. The '84 Honda, that's the 
9 250, I recognize I can miss somewhat here, only owned one 
10 motorcycle in my life, and it was smarter than me, and I 
11 went down. You see how much I know about motorcycles. 
12 But I'll set it at four fifty. Undoubtedly the 68 — 
13 and I assume this is two of them? 
14 MR. RUSSELL: Yes. We'd stipulate to one 
15 each on those. 
16 MS. DONOVAN: That's correct. 
17 THE COURT: It would be my guess to give each 
18 of you one, but if they are that old — They are little 
19 trail bikes? I think $50.00 figure is pretty close. 
20 MR. RUSSELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Now, there's — you've got a 
22 Honda 80, here again it's a small trail bike, $125.00. 
23 I've got another Honda 75, and I assume that's a little 
24 street bike. 
25 MR. FINLAYSON: Same as the other one. 
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1 MS. DONOVAN: We both have that as $50.00. 
2 THE COURT: Down to the '78 Honda 75 ccs. 
3 MS. DONOVAN: We've both listed that at 
4 fifty. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Now, you're down to your 
6 boat. 
7 MR. RUSSELL: Yes, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Two thousand five hundred. Have 
9 you got something else you want to value? 
10 MS. DONOVAN: We have some other accounts, 
11 stock accounts, Equity Trust account. 
12 THE COURT: If they are stock accounts, 
13 we'll just look at the last quote on it. If they are 
14 listed on any board — are they? 
15 MR. RUSSELL: Yes, they are listed, Your 
16 Honor. We might suggest a fifty fifty in kind 
17 distribution on it. 
18 THE COURT: That would be the general goal, 
19 except you're going to have to be even on the big bottom 
20 pictures. All I'll do is go and look at the newspaper. 
21 So, whatever the newspaper says they are worth. What the 
22 Wall Street Journal says they are worth today is what 
23 they are worth. Is that clear? Do they all appear in 
24 the Wall Street Journal somewhere? 
25 MS. DONOVAN: I'm sure they do, or they have 
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the most current statements. So you're saying that in 
theory those should be divided equally subject to the 
bottom line on the other assets? 
THE COURT: Yes. You realize when I get close 
to the bottom line I have to start making people take 
things, maybe. But the real real bottom line is cash. 
MS. DONOVAN: Right. 
You understand that? 
Yes, Your Honor. 




each say about those? 
MS. DONOVAN: 
The life, USA policy? 
THE COURT: 
MS. DONOVAN: 
at least one, they be divided equally. 
MR. RUSSELL: Yeah, ours. 
Which policies, Your Honor? 
Yes 







them be split. 
THE COURT: 
Yeah. 
Can you split ownership? 
I don't even know, Judge. 
Our understanding is you can, 
We would suggest that both of 
If you can't, you're going to end 
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1 up flipping coins. That's the bottom line. This coin 
2 collection, the only thing I can do is make you bring it 
3 into court, or some place, and start picking up coins. 
4 MS. DONOVAN: Camper World membership, Your 
5 Honor? 
6 THE COURT: I'm amazed at the high value 
7 placed on it. 
8 MS. DONOVAN: She called and asked them what 
9 going memberships were, and that's what they told her. 
10 THE COURT: They must have paid a whole lot 
11 less than that. 
12 MR. RUSSELL: Several thousand dollars less. 
13 MS. FINLAYSON: I think we paid $7,000 for 
14 it. 
15 MR. RUSSELL: Less $4,000 would be our 
16 proffer. 
17 MS. DONOVAN: Her proffer would be they paid 
18 around seven. 
19 MS. FINLAYSON: I don't have the papers; 
20 Roger does. 
21 THE COURT: Put it down on the choice on the 
22 person who gets it, gets it for four thousand five 
23 hundred. Divide the coins coin at a time, unless you 
24 agree on it. The gun collection we've talked about. The 
25 tools we've talked about. The dolls we talked about. I 
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take it the various accounts are worth what they say they 
are. What about the big vault? 
MS. DONOVAN: We listed it at twelve hundred. 
MR. RUSSELL: We proposed, Your Honor, that 
that be one of the items to be divided, along with the 
fireplace insert, utility trailer, cement mixer, riding 
lawnmower, mulcher, snowblower, canoe. We're into small 
personal property at this point. 





Yes, Your Honor. 
Anything else? 
Your Honor, I had a few matters 
of clarification. The first one is that the court is 
awarding monthly child support as per the stipulated 
guideline sheet, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: That's true. Minimum wage for 
each. I think that's the figure you used; isn't it? 
MS. DONOVAN: No. It was based upon actual 
earnings of about $300.00 a month each. 
THE COURT: Let's see, minimum wage — 
MS, DONOVAN 
month, Your Honor. 
MR. RUSSELL 
THE COURT: 
: It's around seven 
: That's historical 
I think they should 







1 charged with minimum wage. 
2 MR. RUSSELL: For the purposes of alimony, or 
3 child support? 
4 THE COURT: Both. I think they are equal as 
5 far as earning capacity. She's less schooled, but he's 
6 more schooled, but his health isn't as good and her. I 
7 think they are about — between now and death, they 
8 should come close to the same. 
9 MR. RUSSELL: I understand the court's 
10 ruling, Your Honor. 
11 MS. DONOVAN: Bill, do you have some other 
12 questions? 
13 MR. RUSSELL: No. 
14 MS. DONOVAN: Your Honor, are you going to 
15 order any counseling for Trisha? 
16 THE COURT: If you — if one side or another 
17 will fine a counselor who's willing to work with her, the 
18 court will order counseling, and require each to pay 
19 half. 
20 MS. DONOVAN: Just so I'm clear ~ 
21 THE COURT: But it would have to be a 
22 counselor of some repute. I don't want to send her to 
23 just anybody. Get somebody that's worked with children, 
24 and this type of thing. There are people who do it. And 
25 they usually accomplish something. 
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1 MS. DONOVAN: Your Honor, if I understand 
2 your ruling, I believe you're saying that you are — with 
3 regard to the Hallmark Card Shop, you're recognizing that 
4 original fourteen thousand dollar debt to Mrs. Finlayson 
5 with simple interest at the rate of $841.51 per — 
6 THE COURT: I think that's six percent. 
7 MS. DONOVAN: If those figures are accurate, 
8 I did some rough figures, over the last twenty-seven 
9 years the total of that would be close to thirty-six — 
10 $37,000 total obligation. She's received $67,000. 
11 THE COURT: I know this. 
12 MS. DONOVAN: It appears there's an over-
13 payment then to her. Are you saying, then, that — I'm 
14 not quite sure how we're to deal with that. Is the rest 
15 of the other money considered marital money to be divided 
16 equally? 
17 THE COURT: Yes. I don't think that debt is 
18 any greater than what I've said. 
19 MS. DONOVAN: So it appears there's been an 
20 over-payment, and funds should be coming back. 
21 THE COURT: Not necessarily, because I don't 
22 know whether he paid that money on that debt, or whether 
23 he paid it on the rent debt. I don't know whether he 
24 paid -- what he paid the money --
25 MR. RUSSELL: That also begs the inquiry that 
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1 we have to have a finding on an amount that she withdrew 
2 from the account, which is our last entry, 
3 THE COURT: I believe there's no dispute on 
4 it; is there? 
5 MS, DONOVAN: It was the $25,000 figure, 
6 MR. RUSSELL: Thirty-five thousand. 
7 MS. DONOVAN: It wasn't thirty-five. There 
8 was a withdrawal of twenty-five thousand on here. The 
9 only withdrawal he shows on his exhibit, 25,988.89. 
10 MR. RUSSELL: It's not on -- that exhibit is 
11 not a model of clarity. I believe the bank record will 
12 show that she did an actual withdrawal of about $35,000, 
13 overdrafted the account by $9,500. 
14 MS. DONOVAN: There's no evidence of that. 
15 Those statements that were submitted into evidence — 
16 THE COURT: I can go through those, and go 
17 back through the evidence unless you just want to draw an 
18 inquiry. There's no sense in having a court hearing this 
19 with attorneys' fees over it. If you checked with the 
20 institution, they'll tell you what was withdrawn. 
21 MS. DONOVAN: Just so I'm clear, then, Your 
22 Honor, my client — 
23 THE COURT: It's my impression that she drew 
24 about thirty-five, but I might be wrong. 
25 MS. DONOVAN: But there's no record, other 
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1 than what he says. There's no bank statement or anything 
2 else. I'm sure we can get the record on that. Are you 
3 saying, whatever was in that account should be divided 
4 equally less whatever she withdrew? 
5 THE COURT: And he withdrew. 
6 MS. DONOVAN: All of that is a fifty fifty 
7 division; correct? 
8 THE COURT: That's true. Only subject to 
9 the bottom line. 
10 MS. DONOVAN: If he's overpaid his mother, 
11 then my client gets a credit? 
12 THE COURT: This is true. If he's used some 
13 of his share to pay his mother, that's his problem. 
14 MS. DONOVAN: On the lot, I understand your 
15 ruling to say that that lot, even though it was in both 
16 of their names, is not marital property? 
17 THE COURT: I think — in the first place, I 
18 think it's a trustee. And the second place, I think that 
19 he is not a trustee. His only involvement would be that 
20 he's in there on an early inheritance. 
21 MS. DONOVAN: There was testimony that they 
22 would be given any credit for taxes that they made over 
23 the years. Are you going to order that that happen? 
24 THE COURT: That's the -- you realize that 
25 when you get involved in those taxes and that kind of 
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1 thing, you might have to face her. If defense counsel 
2 goes and files a lawsuit tomorrow, this might change this 
3 whole thing for her. The ninety-three year old mother, 
4 she's still here, and we're going to have to deal with 
5 her if she comes. 
6 MS. DONOVAN: So what are you saying on the 
7 taxes? Her testimony was that they were going to arrange 
8 it, and be reimbursed. 
9 THE COURT: I don't know why you're excited 
10 on this. How much are the taxes on a vacant lot? 
11 MS. DONOVAN: They've been paying them for 
12 fifteen years or so. Five hundred a year. 
13 MR. RUSSELL: I've got it right here. 
14 MR. RUSSELL: 407, 414. Eight hundred for 
15 two years. No, that's not it. 
16 MS. DONOVAN: It could be $6,000 for the last 
17 few years. 
18 THE COURT: He's going to have to settle that 
19 with his mother. I think as far as his credit is 
20 concerned, no. Don't give credit for it now. It was 
21 some — if that was given away, it was given away the 
22 year in which it was paid, and it's no longer — How he 
23 makes out with his mother is another problem. I can't 
24 believe that the taxes are that high on a vacant lot. 
25 MS. DONOVAN: We have the receipts for it. 
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1 So you're saying there would be no credit? 
2 MS. DONOVAN: That's true. 
3 THE COURT: That was given away years ago. 
4 MS. DONOVAN: Are you making any order on 
5 attorney's fees, Your Honor? 
6 THE COURT: Yes. But are you ready for that? 
7 MS. DONOVAN: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: Basically, I think the parties both 
9 have assets, and under the series of Utah cases have 
10 recourse to pay their own attorneys. Court believes that 
11 there has been unnecessary proceedings brought on by the 
12 failure to let her see the child, and this type of thing, 
13 so that he must make a contribution of $500.00 to her 
14 fees because of those items. But that is all. Other 
15 than that, they both have funds they can pay their own 
16 way. 
17 MS. DONOVAN: Are you making any order on 
18 contempt, Your Honor? 
19 THE COURT: I can not find any contempt on 
20 the evidence I've received here. I think he's shown lack 
21 of wisdom in some respects, but I cannot say contempt. 
22 MS. DONOVAN: Are you making a specific 
23 visitation schedule, Your Honor? 
24 THE COURT: No, because I'm not sure — I'll 
25 do so if it's necessary to talk to the girl. I would 
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1 I suggest that you stipulate that you have her appear 
2 before one of the commissioners, and let the Commissioner 
3 set it. Now, Judge Peuler, did he see her at all, or did 
4 he just talk with her? 
5 MS. DONOVAN: Commissioner Peuler spoke with 
6 her and one of the other children, yes. 
7 THE COURT: I would suggest that I transfer 
8 that back to see if you can settle it before a 
9 Commissioner. I think the more you involve that girl in 
10 coming into court, the bigger a mistake you'll make. 
11 MS. DONOVAN: Your Honor, just so I'm clear 
12 on what we're doing, it appears that you've placed 
13 certain values on these items, and after we go out and 
14 have our picnic, as you call it, and figure out who gets 
15 what with these certain values, we'll come down to the 
16 the bottom line then, and determine if one or the other 
17 owes the other money? 
18 THE COURT: That's true. Not owe money, they 
19 owe — 
20 MS. DONOVAN: Credit? 
21 THE COURT: There's going to be money coming 
22 out of the house. Plaintiff's attorney has one week to 
23 draft the papers, and get them over to defense attorney 
24 for approval as to form. If she doesn't do it, then he 
25 gets one week. 
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MS. DONOVAN: Maybe I should wait a week, 
then he'll have to do it. 
MR. RUSSELL: I object to that, Your Honor. 
I don't object to that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sometimes you like to control 
things. 
MR. RUSSELL: That's fine 
THE COURT: Is there anything else? 
MR. RUSSELL: Nothing at this time. 
MS. DONOVAN: I don't think so, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let me say this to the two 
parents. You're both decent people, and when you got 
married, I think you probably had high hopes for 
everything. I think this is true. I think today you're 
still decent people. I don't know what happened, why you 
waged war on one another now with the intensity with 
which you both wage it. The evidence doesn't disclose it 
to me. There may be good reasons for it. But I would 
try the best I could not to wage war through the child. 
My guess is she's terribly torn. I have only been a 
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1 love you for it. If you ever pulled a few white lies in 
2 your life, I suggest you do now, because that's the only 
3 hope you've got. Otherwise, nobody likes to be told that 
4 their parent are merciless. You tell her that, they'll 
5 say why did you pick him to be my father, and vice versa. 
6 You almost have to say kind things, even if you have to 
7 leave something unsaid. 
8 Is there any other questions? 
9 MR. RUSSELL: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
10 MS. DONOVAN: No, Your Honor. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(THIRD PROPOSED) 
Case No. 904905062 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
(Tried by Judge Wahlquist) 
This matter was tried to the Court on October 17 and 
18, 1991, after the parties stipulated to certain matters on the 
record. Plaintiff and Defendant were both present and 
represented by counsel of record, Sharon A. Donovan for the 
Plaintiff and William R. Russell for the Defendant. Both parties 
presented evidence and argument, whereupon the Court entered its 
ruling upon the record in open Court, and after which the parties 
entered into stipulations as to the division of numerous items of 
minor personal property not specifically awarded by the Court. 
Defendant's counsel drafted proposed Findings, Conclusions, and a 
Decree of Divorce, which were served by personal delivery upon 
Plaintiff's counsel on December 10, 1991. Thereafter, 
Plaintiff's counsel timely filed an Objection to the form of the 
same. Defendant's counsel prepared Second Proposed Findings, 
Conclusions, and Decree, incorporating some of the changes 
A-34 00149 
requested in said Objection, and a hearing was held on the 
remaining objections on February 21, 1992, after which the Court 
ordered changes and additional language. 
Based upon these proceedings, and for good cause shown, 
the Court makes and enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, and had been such for more than three months 
immediately prior to the filing of the Complaint herein. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on September 
4, 1964 and since that time lived in the marital home until their 
separation on about December 21, 1990. Prior to physical 
separation, the parties ceased to live as husband and wife but 
continued to occupy the same dwelling. 
3. The parties are parents of several children, but 
only one has not yet attained the age of majority: Trisha 
Finlayson, age 15. No other children are expected. 
4. Both parties are fit and proper persons to be 
awarded the legal custody of the minor child, Trisha Finlayson, 
and joint legal custody is appropriate. It is in the best 
interests of the child that Defendant be awarded her sole 
physical custody. Plaintiff should be allowed reasonable 
visitation, as set forth in and in accordance with the standard 
visitation schedule promulgated by the Third District Court, a 
copy of which is attached hereto. The primary reason for the 
Court's ruling is the obvious choice of the daughter. Her style 






closely bonded to the father as she prefers to eat meals with 
him, watch television with him, and spend hours visiting with 
him. An unusual characteristic of this fifteen year old girl, 
she is frightened in the night, she goes and sleeps on her 
father's bed. I find no evidence of incest, and believe this is 
the process of personal fear in the maturity of the child. 
Either party may select a qualified family counsellor, who 
regularly works with children, to engage the minor child in 
sessions relating to the separation and divorce, and continuing 
relationships and visitation with her parents. Each party shall 
cooperate to schedule sessions, and each shall pay one-half of 
reasonable counselling fees. 
5. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay monthly monetary 
base child support to Defendant, in accordance with the Uniform 
Support Guidelines. In this regard, the Court finds that each 
party is relatively able-bodied, has employable skills, is 
capable of presently obtaining and maintaining full-time minimum 
wage employment, and each is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed. As such each is attributed with minimum-wage, 
full-time earnings in the amount of $731 gross per month, and the 
same amount is hereby imputed. In accordance with the previously 
filed Worksheet, a copy of which is attached hereto, Plaintiff 
should be ordered to pay to Defendant the sum of $102.50 as 
monthly base child support. 
6. Both parties have engaged in employment since their 
separation, Plaintiff is presently employed part-time, and the 
Defendant is not presently employed. In light of the findings of 
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employability and the income imputed to each of them in paragraph 
5 above, while both parties may be in need of some financial 
support, neither party has the ability to pay the same, and 
accordingly no alimony should be awarded at this time. 
7. The parties have acquired an interest in real 
property during the marriage, located at 4950 Highland Circle, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, which is presently listed for sale with a 
realtor. It is reasonable that Defendant be awarded the 
exclusive use and occupancy of the home, to reside there with the 
minor child, until December 31, 1991. If the home has not been 
sold by that date, Defendant shall be charged with a reasonable 
rental amount, beginning for the month of January of 1992, which 
is found to be $400 per month, as a deduction from the proceeds 
of any eventual sale thereof, for each month he occupies the same 
prior to sale. Defendant shall make necessary repairs on the 
home, while he resides there, as his abilities and resources 
enable him to do so. If the home remains unsold on June 30, 
1992, Plaintiff may petition the Court for an Order requiring the 
Defendant to vacate the home, upon a showing that the Defendant 
has failed to take reasonable steps to promptly sell the home. 
If the Court then grants said petition, Plaintiff may be allowed 
to move back into the home and Plaintiff shall be charged with a 
like $400 per month rental amount against her proceeds from the 
eventual sale thereof. The Court finds that the home was 
partially purchased with funds realized from the sale of the 
Hallmark store, which was opened and operated by Defendant prior 
to the marriage with funds borrowed from Defendant's parents. 
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The Court further finds that except as to debt to Defendant's 
mother set forth herein, the home and property are within the 
marital estate, and the proceeds thereof shall be divided 
equally, but subject to adjustment to repayment of that loan and 
to awards therefrom to equalize the distribution of the entire 
marital estate. 
8. The parties maintained a joint savings account at 
Zions Bank in 1990. Prior to the date this action was commenced, 
Defendant withdrew therefrom and paid to his mother, Mina 
Finlayson, the total sum of $57,285.03. These payments were made 
to repay the note due to Defendant's parents to open the Hallmark 
store, as more fully described in Finding paragraph 13, below. 
From the testimony at trial, the Court finds that Plaintiff knew 
of the nature and basis of this obligation, and urged the 
Defendant repeatedly throughout the marriage to repay the same. 
The Defendant's father obviously wished to hold control of the 
store and therefore required the signing of the note. This may 
have been partly to protect against creditors, or the weakness of 
the son. This was frequently discussed over the last few years. 
The Court cannot force the son to plead the affirmative defense 
of statute of limitations against his mother. Therefore, in 
justice and equity, the Defendant's mother holds a lien against 
the property, and should receive payment of that note. Up to 
date, monies paid to Mina Finlayson came from the sale of the 
store. Monies owed on the other note are a marital debt 
controlled by these findings. 
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9. In late 1990, Plaintiff withdrew the total sum of 
$35,488.89 from the joint savings account, which she used for her 
separate purposes. Plaintiff is awarded said sum as a separate 
award of marital property. Defendant is awarded his withdrawals 
partially as a separate award of marital property and partially 
as joint marital funds to pay joint marital obligations, to the 
extent set forth in Finding paragraph 13 below. Defendant should 
therefore receive as a separate award the remainder of 
withdrawals, less payment of marital obligations, resulting in 
net separate awards to Defendant of $16,731.29, and to Plaintiff 
in the amount of $35,488.89. 
10. Each party should be ordered to pay any separate 
debts incurred in their own name, or as assigned herein, holding 
the other party harmless therefrom. 
11. The parties have acquired interests in thousands 
of items of personal property during the marriage. The Court 
attempts to assign values and award distributions on only the 
larger items, and subject to a reconciliation of the entire 
marital estate to achieve equal distribution. Plaintiff is 
awarded all of the "Precious Moments" dolls, at a value of 
$1,000, and the Defendant is awarded all of the tools in the 
garage, at a value of $1,000. The parties1 child(ren) may have 
some asserted interest in the tools but the Court awards them to 
Defendant subject to any interest the child(ren) may have, and 
Defendant alone shall account to said child(ren) for the delivery 
of said promised or gifted tools. Plaintiff is awarded the Honda 
Accord automobile and the Defendant is awarded the Jeep Wagoneer, 
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each at a value of $7,4 50. Each party is awarded one of the two 
Honda 75cc motorcycles. Each party shall receive one-half of the 
present interest in the Commonwealth Equity Trust fund, the 
Putnam Fund, the proceeds from the failed Thrift liquidators, the 
USA Life Insurance policy, and the Utah Power stock, which now is 
owned by PacifiCorp. The Court finds that all of the above items 
of personal property, as awarded are approximately equal and an 
equitable division thereof. It would be ridiculous for the Court 
to litigate the division of each one of their assets, and would 
consume hundreds of hours. The attorney's fees would exceed 
their value. At the time of the last conference on Findings of 
Fact, some division had occurred. The Court approves the 
division made by agreement. The basic order was that the bailiff 
would throw a coin to determine which person had first choice of 
the first item, and they would alternate those materials. The 
Court will apply this division method to the remaining assets as 
the only economic way to divide what may be hundreds more items. 
12o The Court finds that during the marriage (in 19 78) 
Mina Finlayson, the Defendant's mother, and/or a trust related to 
her, deeded real property located at 4946 Highland Circle, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, jointly to the parties, which deed was duly 
delivered and recorded. Said property is a vacant lot located 
adjacent to the marital home, and was owned by Mina Finlayson 
with her husband, who had died prior to the transfer of record 
title. From the testimony of Mina Finlayson and other witnesses 
at trial, the Court finds that Mina had, at the time of the 
transfer to the parties, decided to sell the property and as a 
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result, deeded the property to the parties as trustees, to 
maintain and attempt to sell the property for her. The Court 
further finds that said transfer was without donative intent, 
that no equitable interest passed to the parties, and that Minafs 
intent was solely to allow the parties to act as her agents in 
maintaining and selling the lot. Marital funds were used to pay 
the property taxes for such parcel as they came due. The 
Defendant did not request reimbursement for the taxes from his 
mother because of the two note obligations owed to her (more 
fully described in Finding paragraph 13, below) were of a 
substantial nature and had not yet been repaid. All dealings 
with the property have occurred since the marriage. There has 
been perhaps six thousand dollars paid in taxes, but there has no 
interest paid on any other debt. The Court regards this as a 
wash. As such, the Court finds that said real property is not 
within the marital estate. Each of the parties should be ordered 
to execute a Quit-Claim deed in favor of Mina Finlayson, her 
successor, or her designated agent. 
13. Prior to the marriage, Defendant borrowed funds, 
in the amount of $14,800.84, from his parents to open a Hallmark 
store in the Cottonwood Mall, which was operated by Defendant 
prior to the marriage and by both parties during the marriage, 
and was later sold during the marriage. Said obligation was 
evidenced by a written promissory note, dated September 4, 19 62 
with stated interest of 6% per cent per annum, but without 
reference to simple or compound interest. While the Court finds 
both parties substantially contributed to the operation and 
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success of the business, the Court finds that although the 
business and its proceeds were in large part marital property, 
equity requires that the originally borrowed set-up funds be 
repaid by the parties from marital assets. The Court also finds 
that without this loan from Defendant's parents, the parties 
would not have had the opportunity to engage in and build the 
business, and reap its benefits. Thus, Defendant's repayment of 
funds to his mother in late 19 90 were properly paid by marital 
funds held in a joint savings account. The Court finds simple 
interest to be applicable, and that interest accrued in the 
amount of $888.03 per year for 29 years ($25,752.87 total 
interest through trial), which, added to the principal amount, 
equals a total obligation of $40,553.74. Defendant made several 
repayments on said note in 1990. Insofar as repayments made to 
Mina Finlayson were made up to that amount, they are properly 
paid with joint funds. The separate note from Defendant to his 
parents for rental amounts owed to them for marital housing 
expenses is held unenforceable, and additional amounts paid to 
Mina from joint marital funds shall be charged to Defendant as a 
receipt of marital funds, which calculations are set forth in 
Finding paragraph 8, above. The Defendant's father, for reasons 
not fully disclosed in the evidence except by circumstantial 
inference, wished to maintain control of the store and may or may 
not have regarded it as a potential asset owned by himself. 
There is no fixed amount, but at the time the note was made, it 
was intended to cover inventory, and readily determinable by the 
parties, but held some possible dispute with creditors. There 
has been no payment on this amount, but it has been discussed 
throughout the marriage by the parties. The son should not be 
forced to plead to the statute of limitations against his mother. 
The mother holds a lien for that inventory as against these 
litigants. The Court treats these two obligations differently 
because the store loan is attributable to the creation of marital 
property which the parties have enjoyed, but the rental loan 
yielded no asset subject to division. With reference to the 
"monies for rent" note, this loan was made during the marriage, 
with fixed interest at six percent. It was intended eventually 
that it would be paid. There was no payment on it. The statute 
of limitations has run. The wife has the right to plead the 
statute of limitations. In justice and equity, she should be 
regarded as free of the debt. Payments on that debt are 
considered voluntary by Defendant, and come from his share. 
Accordingly, Defendant alone shall be responsible to discharge 
the note relating to housing expenses, holding the Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
14. In addition to the above distribution, the Court 
finds the following values, and finds as equitable the following 
additional awards of property to the party so designated: 
TO PLAINTIFF TO DEFENDANT 
Savings Withdrawals 
$35,488.89 $16,731.29 







1974 Dodge Van $500.00 
Gulfstream Boat $2,500.00 
Dune Buggy $300.00 
TOTALS $50,288.89 $21,031.29 
From the above awards, the Court finds that the 
Plaintiff has received $29,257.60 more than Defendant from the 
marital estate distribution. The Court therefore finds that in 
order to equalize the distribution of property, Defendant shall 
first receive said deficiency amount, as his sole and separate 
property and free from any claim of Plaintiff, less the $500 
awarded to Plaintiff as attorney's fees in Finding paragraph 17 
below, for a net amount of $28,757.60, from the net proceeds of 
the eventual sale of the marital home. The remaining net proceeds 
shall be divided equally between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
Plaintiff's counsel has recorded an attorneyfs lien against the 
property to secure payment of their fees, which shall be 
satisfied from the remaining sale proceeds awarded to Plaintiff, 
if the same has not then been paid, in the manner and priority 
provided by law. 
15. It is reasonable that each party be granted as 
their sole and separate property their personal effects and 
belongings and any items they possessed before the marriage which 
have not lost their individual character by comingling. The 
parties shall go to the home, where many items of personal 
property are stored, and each shall remove any items that were 
acquired before the marriage as their separate property. The 
remaining marital items shall be divided item by item, by lot or 
A-44 
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chance as to the first selection and alternating thereafter, and 
Plaintiff shall remove items so distributed from the house. 
Family photographs shall also be divided, but each party shall 
have the right to make reproductions thereof at that party's sole 
expense. 
16. No contempt of the Court's previous orders as to 
either party has been shown, nor is the same found. 
17. Defendant should be ordered to pay Plaintiff's 
attorney's fees in the sum of $500, and the same should be 
awarded, due to legal expenses incurred in pursuing sale of the 
home and other issues, as set forth in paragraph 14 above. 
18. During the course of the marriage, irreconcilable 
differences arose between the parties, which led to their 
separation and have made continuation of the marital relationship 
imposs ible. 
19. The parties should be ordered to execute any 
documents or perform any acts necessary and reasonable to 
effectuate the provisions of the Decree of Divorce. 
20. Each party should be ordered to pay one-half of 
any uninsured medical expenses of the minor child. Neither party 
has health or medical insurance available at low or no cost at 
this time, but if either becomes eligible to obtain the same, 
each should be ordered to obtain the such insurance for the minor 
child. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
hereby enters the following 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and 
subject matter of this action for Divorce. 
2. Grounds for Divorce exist under Utah law. 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to the entry of a Decree of 
Divorce, dissolving the state of matrimony existing between 
Plaintiff and Defendant, said Decree to contain all relevant 
provisions of the Findings-and Conclusions set forth herein. 
DATED this / / day of March, 1992. 
BY THE COU#T: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
^^K4L*A^W*\ d • 
SHARON A. DONOVAN 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the *- day of March, 1992, 
the original and a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (Third Proposed) was hand-delivered to: 
Sharon A. Donovan 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
310 South Main, #1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
// fC-UU^ 
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WILLIAM R. RUSSELL (2833) 
Attorney for Defendant 
8 East Broadway, Suite 213 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-4600 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 






DECREE OF DIVORCE 
(THIRD PROPOSED) .<->. _ ^ 
Case No. 904905062 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
(Tried by Judge Wahlquist) 
Based upon the stipulations of the parties, the 
evidence at trial, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law (Third Proposed) entered herein, it is hereby 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: 
1. Plaintiff is hereby awarded this Decree of Divorce, 
dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the 
Plaintiff and Defendant, upon the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences, to become final upon entry hereof. 
2. Both parties are hereby awarded the joint legal 
custody of the minor child, Trisha Finlayson. Defendant is 
hereby awarded her sole and exclusive physical custody. 
Plaintiff is granted reasonable visitation, as set forth in and 
in accordance with the standard visitation schedule promulgated 
by the Third District Court. Either party may select a qualified 
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family counsellor, who regularly works with children, to engage 
the minor child in sessions relating to the separation and 
divorce, and continuing relationships and visitation with her 
parents. Each party shall cooperate to schedule sessions, and 
each shall pay one-half of reasonable counselling fees. 
3. Plaintiff is ordered to pay monthly monetary base 
child support to Defendant, in the amount of $102.50, which 
amount is in accordance with the Uniform Support Guidelines. 
4. No alimony is awarded. 
5. Defendant is hereby awarded the exclusive use and 
occupancy of the former marital home, located at 4950 Highland 
Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, to reside there with the minor 
child, until December 31, 1991. If the home has not been sold by 
that date, Defendant shall be charged with a reasonable rental 
amount, which is found to be $400 per month, as a deduction from 
the proceeds of any eventual sale thereof, for each month he 
occupies the same prior to sale. Defendant shall make necessary 
repairs on the home, while he resides there, as his abilities and 
resources enable him to do so. If the home remains unsold on 
June 30, 1992, Plaintiff may petition the Court for an Order 
requiring the Defendant to vacate the home, upon a showing that 
the Defendant has failed to take reasonable steps to promptly 
sell the home. If the Court then grants said petition, Plaintiff 
may be allowed to move back into the home and Plaintiff shall be 
charged with a like $400 per month rental amount against her 
proceeds from the eventual sale thereof. 
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6. The parties maintained a joint savings account at 
Zions Bank in 1990. Prior to the date this action was commenced, 
Defendant withdrew therefrom and paid to his mother, Mina 
Finlayson, the total sum of $57,285.03- These payments were made 
to repay the note due to Defendant's parents to open the Hallmark 
store, as more fully described below. In late 1990, Plaintiff 
withdrew the total sum of $35,488.89 from the joint savings 
account, which she used for her separate purposes. Plaintiff is 
awarded said sum as a separate award of marital property. 
Defendant is awarded his withdrawals partially as a separate 
award of marital property and partially as joint marital funds to 
pay joint marital obligations. Defendant is therefore credited 
as a separate award the remainder of withdrawals, less payment of 
marital obligations, resulting in net separate awards to 
Defendant of $16,731.29, and to Plaintiff in the amount of 
$35,488.89 from this account. 
7. Each party is ordered to pay any separate debts 
incurred in their own name, or as assigned herein, holding the 
other party harmless therefrom. 
8. The parties have acquired interests in thousands of 
items of personal property during the marriage. The Court 
attempts to assign values and award distributions on only the 
larger items, and subject to a reconciliation of the entire 
marital estate to achieve equal distribution. Plaintiff is 
awarded all of the "Precious Moments" dolls, at a value of 
$1,000, and the Defendant is awarded all of the tools in the 
garage, at a value of $1,000. 
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The parties1 child(ren) may have some asserted interest in the 
tools but the Court awards them to Defendant subject to any 
interest the child(ren) may have, and Defendant alone shall 
account to said child(ren) for the delivery of said promised or 
gifted tools. Plaintiff is awarded the Honda Accord automobile 
and the Defendant is awarded the Jeep Wagoneer, each at a value 
of $7,4 50, Each party is awarded one of the two Honda 75cc 
motorcycles. Each party shall receive one-half of the present 
interest in the Commonwealth Equity Trust fund, the Putnam Fund, 
the proceeds from the failed Thrift liquidators, the USA Life 
Insurance policy, and the Utah Power stock, which now is owned by 
PacifiCorp. The Court finds that all of the above items of 
personal property, as awarded are approximately equal and an 
equitable division thereof. The Court approves the parties 
division of household items as previously stuipulated, ordered 
and effectuated:, 
9. Both parties are ordered to forthwith execute a 
quit-claim deed for the real property located at 494 6 Highland 
Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah to Mina Finlayson, her successor, or 
her designated agent. 
10. Prior to the marriage, Defendant borrowed funds, 
in the amount of $14,800.84, from his parents to open a Hallmark 
store in the Cottonwood Mall, which was operated by Defendant 
prior to the marriage and by both parties during the marriage, 
and was later sold during the marriage. Said obligation was 
evidenced by a written promissory note, dated September 4, 19 62 
with stated interest of 6% per cent per annum, but without 
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reference to simple or compound interest. While the Court finds 
both parties substantially contributed to the operation and 
success of the business, the Court finds that although the 
business and its proceeds were in large part marital property, 
equity requires that the originally borrowed set-up funds be 
repaid by the parties from marital assets. The Court also finds 
that without this loan from Defendant's parents, the parties 
would not have had the opportunity to engage in and build the 
business, and reap its benefits. Thus, Defendant's repayment of 
funds to his mother in late 1990 were properly paid by marital 
funds held in a joint savings account. The Court rules simple 
interest to be applicable, and that interest accrued in the 
amount of $888.03 per year for 29 years ($25,752.87 total 
interest through trial), which, added to the principal amount, 
equals a total obligation of $40,553.74. Defendant made several 
repayments on said note in 1990. Insofar as repayments made to 
Mina Finlayson were made up to that amount, they are held to be 
marital debts properly paid with joint funds. The separate note 
from Defendant to his parents for rental amounts owed to them for 
marital housing expenses is held unenforceable, and additional 
amounts paid to Mina from joint marital funds shall be charged to 
Defendant as a receipt of marital funds, which calculations are 
set forth in paragraph 6, above. The Court treats these two 
obligations differently because the store loan is attributable to 
the creation of marital property which the parties have enjoyed, 
but the rental loan yielded no asset subject to division. The 
Court further treats the "monies for rent note differently for 
A
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the additional reasons set forth in the Findings of Fact (Third 
Proposed), heretofore entered, and upon which this decree is 
based. Accordingly, Defendant alone shall be responsible to 
discharge the note relating to housing expenses, holding the 
Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
11. In addition to the above distribution, the Court 
finds the following values, and equitably awards the following 










1974 Dodge Van $500.00 
Gulfstream Boat $2,500.00 
Dune Buggy $300.00 
TOTALS $50,288.89 $21,031.2 9 
From the above awards, the Court finds that the 
Plaintiff has received $29,257.60 more than Defendant from the 
marital estate distribution. The Court therefore orders, in 
order to equalize the distribution of property, that Defendant 
shall first receive said amount, as his sole and separate 
property and free from any claim of Plaintiff, less the $500 
awarded to Plaintiff as attorneyfs fees in paragraph 14 below, 






eventual sale of the marital home, after which the remaining net 
proceeds shall be divided equally between Plaintiff and 
Defendant. Plaintiff's counsel has recorded an attorney's lien 
against the property to secure payment of their fees, which shall 
be satisfied from the remaining sale proceeds awarded to 
Plaintiff, if the same has not then been paid, in the manner and 
priority provided by law. 
12. Each party is awarded as their sole and separate 
property their personal effects and belongings and any items they 
possessed before the marriage which have not lost their 
individual character by comingling. The parties shall go to the 
home, where many items of personal property are stored, and each 
shall remove any items that were acquired before the marriage as 
their separate property. The remaining marital items shall be 
divided item by item, by lot or chance as to the first selection 
and alternating thereafter, and Plaintiff shall remove items so 
distributed from the house. Family photographs shall also be 
divided, but each party shall have the right to make 
reproductions thereof at that party's sole expense. 
13. No contempt of the Court's previous orders as to 
either party has been shown, and no citation thereof is entered. 
14. Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff's attorney's 
fees in the sum of $500, and the same should be awarded, due to 
legal expenses incurred in pursuing sale of the home and other 
issues, to be paid as set forth in paragraph 11 above. 
15. The parties are ordered to execute any documents 
or perform any acts necessary and reasonable to effectuate the 
provisions of this Decree of Divorce. 
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16 o Each party is ordered to pay one-half of any 
uninsured medical expenses of the minor child. Neither party has 
health or medical insurance available at low or no cost at this 
time, but if either becomes eligible to obtain the same, each is 
ordered to obtain such insurance for the minor child. 
DATED this / 7 day of March, 1992. 
BY THE COLmT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
^ M ^ r A ^ J ; 
JOHN F. -WAHLQUIST 
Senior District Judg 
SHARON A. DONOVAN 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2 y\CA ^ ^ . _. . _ day of March, 199 2, 
a copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce (Third Proposed) was 
hand-delivered to: 
Sharon A. Donovan 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
310 South Main, #1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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Third Jud'Ctal District 
MAY 1 9 1992 
By 
.lL**cC0'jr4TY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 







CIVIL NO. 904905062 DA 
JUDGE JOHN F. WAHLQUIST 
I will comment on the major points referred to in the briefs 
concerning the motions for a new trial. 
SLEEPING JUDGE ISSUE 
I was a judge in my youth. For fifteen years I was Utah's 
youngest. An older judge (Judge Ellett) , told me that if I lived 
long enough I, too, would be stereotyped as a sleeping judge. He 
predicted it would first occur in an ugly divorce contest where £# 
one could possibly enjoy "20 winks11. He predicted that endless 
insults would be hurled back and forth. (See plaintiff's and 
defendant's recent affidavits alleging misconduct of each other.) 
I have lived long enough to enjoy this stereotyping as an old 
judge. 
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It is not only old judges who pick up this stereotyping. A 
Washington columnist pointed out that during presentations 
President Reagan would look down and listen without 
interrupting. One or more disappointed people in the back of 
the room always accused him of sleeping. 
I do not recall sleeping on this case. In fact, I was never 
bored. I was constantly perplexed and asking myself why the 
attorneys and witnesses were saying what was being said. I have 
now asked myself how would a judge know if he had dozed. He 
might later discover that he missed something or not be prepared 
to rule immediately. I experienced none of these things. I 
believed that I suffered the entire ordeal. The courtroom was 
vented. The contest was joined, but there was very little 
conflict in the testimony on the major issues. 
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE 
Irreconcilable differences were clearly evident. In fact, 
for a long time the husband lived in his bedroom, complete with 
refrigerator, television sets, etc. 
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CUSTODY OF CHILD 
The only minor child is a 15 year old girl. She was never a 
witness, but the parties agreed that if she were forced to be a 
witness, she would choose to live with her father. Her older 
brother did testify and implied that his sister would run away 
if custody were awarded to the mother. This 15 year old girl 
was described in the testimony as a frightened, immature, and 
insecure girl. She was plagued by sleep disturbances and would 
arise in the night to climb in bed with the father and mother. 
In later years this habit continued, and eventually her parents 
slept in different beds in different rooms. She then went to 
her father's room and slept on his bed. The mother's attorney 
argues the father must be driven from the home to put an end to 
this strange behavior. There was no evidence presented to the 
Court of incest. The mother knew that this behavior continued 
while she was in the home. 
The Court has certainly meditated on this matter and finds 
it is innocent. This testimony has played a part in leaving the 
father and the daughter in the home during the sale period, 
which the Court had hoped would be brief. Another phase of the 
problem is, "Why is the daughter completely alienated from the 
mother?11 
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WORK HISTORY AND THE STORE 
The basic facts are not an issue. The husband had been 
married previously and between the prior marriage and the one in 
court had worked as a carpenter. He was employed on the 
construction of a large Salt Lake mall. His health was not very 
good. His father wanted to help him so he advanced 
approximately $14,000.00 to purchase the inventory for a gift 
store, and the son secured a lease for space in the mall. The 
father was obviously worried about losing the money if the new 
venture failed so he wrote out a note, which was signed by the 
son, wherein the son promised to repay the money to the father 
for all inventory bought with the $14,000.00 at 6% interest; and 
also purports to grant the father a first lien to be ahead of 
all other creditors. The defendant, who was the son, was 
operating the gift store business when he courted the 
plaintiff. This signed note was the property of the defendant7s 
mother when the store was sold. The defendant, who was the son, 
paid off the note to his mother, as the father was dead at the 
time the store was sold. The couple kept the large profit and 
the Court has considered the profit to be marital property. 
This note is written in the handwriting of the father, who 
has been dead for many years. the son testified that he and his 
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wife discussed the origin of the store many times, and she had 
urged him to repay the debt over the years. The defendant's 
parents also helped the couple financially in other ways. 
This store was the only substantial source of income during 
the marriage and both spent their working days there throughout 
the marriage. The Court certainly finds that the origin of the 
store had been freely discussed. It is in a legal sense a 
callable note because the $14,000.00 figure was determinable by 
purchase receipts, etc. The lien that it reserved would 
certainly be ahead of the store owner's share. This payment, 
both morally and legally was proper. 
NOTE FOR THE RENT OF THE APARTMENT 
Early in the parties7 marriage the defendant's parents 
provided them with an apartment for a lengthy period of time. A 
note was signed, but no payment was ever made on it. The 
defendant wants to pay the debt to his elderly mother. The 
plaintiff points out that the note is unenforceable because the 
statute of limitation has run. The Court has ruled that the 
plaintiff may assert this defense against her ex-mother-in-law. 
Of course, the son may repay this note from his personal share 
if he wishes to ease his conscience. The mother of the 
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defendant was a witness. She appears as a refined woman and was 
stylishly dressed etc., but appeared older than her 
chronological age, which is considerable. 
LOT NEXT DOOR 
The plaintiff and the defendant purchased a home early in 
their marriage. The defendant's parents bought a lot next to 
this home, on which they planned to build a home in order to be 
close to the son. The defendant's father died and the mother 
eventually decided not to build on this lot. Both the defendant 
and his mother have testified that they discussed the sale of 
the lot. The defendant's mother decided she would deed the lot 
to the son so he could look after it and put it up for sale. 
Both testified that the deed was made out to him and his wife as 
was the custom in those days, delivered and recorded. The 
defendant testifies that he never got around to carrying out the 
intent. In fact the evidence was strong that he frequently did 
not carry out intentions...his or other people's, as for 
example, the sale of the house as ordered by the Court. It must 
be remembered that the only work history of this couple is the 
tending of the gift card store. 
A-60 
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The plaintiff testified that the transaction involving the 
lot occurred between the mother and the son- She maintains her 
ownership rights on two bases. First, the deed was delivered 
and recorded. Second, that each year when the taxes came due, 
the defendant paid the tax from the couple's joint property. 
The Court has considered the fact that the defendant has 
siblings and may have intended to hold the property until his 
mother died; but the defendant's mother appeared to the Court to 
be an extremely credible witness, and her testimony that is 
rebutted at most by the delivery of the deed, is believed. 
ALIMONY 
The defendant's appearance in Court and the manner in which 
he moves would lead to a gross over-estimation of his age. The 
Court can see no chance of high earnings, but he might be 
employable as a bookkeeper or store clerk at a low wage level. 
The plaintiff's appearance is consistent with her age. Her 
only employment, in addition to clerking at the gift store, is 
with the Deseret Industry. These facts coupled with her 
appearance as a witness convinced the Court that her employment 
possibility is in the low wage range. She has been ordered to 
pay child support in accordance with the tables. 
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It is obvious that neither party is in a position to pay 
alimony from present earnings, while both could probably 
establish a need, 
PERSONAL PROPERTY AND HOME 
The parties prospered while running the gift store. They 
have accumulated more than the average couple. While they 
received some financial support from the defendant's parents, 
their income in the past has exceeded their expenditures. 
However, if their litigation continues their assets will be used 
up in attorneys fees. The Court has attempted to divide their 
personal property equally. This includes insurance accounts, 
stocks, etc. 
There is a small sum awarded as attorney's fees for an 
isolated matter. Both parties could pay a normal fee for 
attorneys, but neither can afford what is occurring. 
The biggest remaining asset is their home. The Court has 
considered it marital property and attempted to force a sale. 
The only reason defendant was given the first opportunity to 
sell was to provide the insecure 15 year old girl with familiar 
surroundings for a short adjustment period. If the sale process 
has broken down as indicated by some of the newer conflicting 
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affidavits, it is possible that there will have to be a new 
adjustment in that the sale may not be occurring as planned. 
This involves events since the trial, but does not change the 
ruling of the 50/50 split. It may be necessary to appoint a 
master to force sale of the home. 
The Court endeavored to divide the major personal items. 
Each party was awarded a car, approximately equal in value. The 
wife got the mobile home. The wife received the doll collection 
valued by the parties at $1,000.00. The husband received the 
tools, but he will have to make his peace with his son, who 
claims ownership of some of these tools. 
To continue that trial to divide thousands of personal items 
would run the attorneys' fees, when combined, to over $2 00.00 
per hour, and cost to the State of Utah even more. The Court 
was impressed that Mr. Russell, the defense attorney, was able 
to maintain his sense of humor and persuade the defendant to try 
to reach an equal division by alternate choosing was the best 
possible plan. 
The plaintiff's attorney, Sharon A. Donovan, appeared 
initially to accept the inevitability of an alternate choice 
system, but seemed to be having trouble with her secretary and 
her client. An example would be the immediate dispute over how 
the cans of spaghetti and other groceries would be divided. 
FINLAYSON V. FINLAYSON PAGE TEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
It may become necessary to appoint a master to divide the 
personal items, but this does not justify the granting of a 
complete new trial and going back to square one. This trial has 
been a terrible ordeal for the parties. To continue it would 
only serve the purpose of delaying the acceptance of some 
decisions unpopular with either or both parties. There is no 
real contest on the divorce, child custody, and some type of 
equal division. In event of a re-trial the Court can see no way 
that either party would gain enough to offset the additional 
attorneys fees. 
The Motion for a New Trial is denied. 
DATED this ; 7 day 
A-64 00237 
FINLAYSON V. FINLAYSON PAGE ELEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this ffl day of May, 1992: 
Sharon A. Donovan 
Shannon W. Clark 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
William R. Russell 
Attorney for Defendant 
8 East Broadway, Suite 213 















Utali o i l R G f i n i n ^ C o m p a n y 
UTAH OIL B U I L D I N G 
S a l t L a l c e C i t y lO, U t a l i 
GLEX A . F 1 X 1 - V Y S O N 
.Architectural Engineer 
>75\DiesUl *•** , ,
 Q / l l f t S-
S « p l . . -4 , I? ^ 2 
To 
filev* A' F»n(a.^5<oK av\<!
 0 r Mi no. 
9 7 3 OctfsUl V-oa-d 
-DEFENDANi 
EXHjB" 
VJ F»n(a^ s a * 
@ S & 5 > > ^ : ciU . N f l n ; P < bor*o«JeJ , ?I»S 6 % in4er^5-f 
x ^ ° ^ e r cJ f inlaas^M *orOflj/sd f ° pay u p or? 
'" t a r 
o v - ^ u u e d a ^ i i^4cv-e i t a r e 
X-f 
"^ f k e 
4**e -Clrsf 
s4or 
e v e n 4 4^4 s 4 o ) - t ?i /70-f a. 5"^iccj5 
" X ^ c ^ . r t c e i W 4 V , m 4 U
 5 a / £ * £ - / 1 ^ 
c?j»*^ «V><j..-f ^« .. s4or_«._ r. ..o.c+r.. /_^ .6„2-
_..„. _ • . . . . . . . 6, .O.^i.. 7>~ - .. 













/ , ^ 5 " 
2-2. 9(3 
2Z, /0 
7 ; 2 6 Z . 94 
/ 4 . Q Q 8 , i>~^ 
A-68 
f 4 , o 0 8. 5 4 . . .. _ . . . 
_ * ..._. _&AQJLl 2^*»<^ '9^3 
&%Q,,g.4_ XgW's i f (9JL4. 
,96/}- _ | | / 5 ,!7j^9^ 2.9 Tb.^fpJ /2Z.Or>>» !(„_ j^o.vi'oy-'--'-^ \phd>—T.<^\£^f^S 
^AA-AO J K ^ ^ S I - i9 6iT 
3.65" Jl L^J .jyiL£bJLi„_J~oJai_ 




_L.1L;- -?&i>. 4 5 " To'foci yyiq^-gy b<gr^oc^go t^^S J u l ^ ^ s -
l j OG (. (3 Ic*+*u*s± \96 7 
( , 12-4. 8c? J w U ^ f ' 9 6 A 
l 9 , £ £ 9 . 3 < 3 To-fcl 
l .I13,36 IwvU^^-S-f / ? £ ? 
_c 
ifeSL < L L , ) C) £>2- . ~~l A- T O TCC I VY1Q (*.<<* horr&oist 6 fl^S S^\<^<f>' 
I. 264. 97 Xn-Ut^ i - i ? ? o 
<*70 *2.£ ; 3 4 7 . "7/ TO4QC/ 
=_===--_ 
3 4 0 , ff>6 -Pul-ev^sf- / 9 7 / 
9 7 / ^ 3 j C38.*5~7 HIT°II vutG*«<^ \OOSYV tuecL pl</s X*I-TTI 
( , 4 .2 / . . Z L J"^4 I t ^ s f (9 7 2. 
/9 72-H ^ f . /O?. S B T~o4oc/ 
_l. Soto. s9_ S- <* 4g^*sf / 9 7 3 
[ H i 
'IJLlJ 
2 . t£ ; & / & . 4 ' 7 ~ O T C U / r f o ^ t r t f k>-7^t*Ouo>o</ ftlv^ J D ^ f - e ^ S T 
../., 5 9^..1'L _A_d-_-_r_-i-_i L i _ l i 
_ 2 . 5 , f^l_iL«__4_6__ TO/ggg—-K^.g-^-f.^ Ifl^^^ot^g«-" /^<-/s j T ^ T ^ ^ 
19.74 
/<? 7S" 





/;.j>_9,?^B.L , Zv±4?.v<rsf JA?.^~ 
_r.__.J.)..JC>4. 38„ Xfeif^.^s,!: L3J£ 
i,.JLo_z.Lo4_ j>f«?_f?i: .1.977 
3 3 ; Q>0 2. , (o9 .TpJrctJ £^-<5n«-if__^r.ii^±til^L_j2/ii> Jj±i^tS±ii. 
2-j.-Q.jLb' * & I^rf-e^sf /<?7& 
3 7 , 7-5^ 9 8 Toral 
A-O , (0 2./ . •? -4 Tblo/ w<s?<-t<?L< k>0^o<x;*c£ ip/^ s Tnlf-t^T 
2-t Ao(. 2 8 J T ^ T ^ S * K°ie\ 
4 2 , 4 ^ 2 , 6 2 . T o U ( 
4 4 , 9 6 7 , 9 6 Tb-kxl 
WAQ v\ JL\J r?Qir\f pots * (4 V ) ( V J J JLtsti^*^ 
^5~Q. 5*2.6. <Q 2 To4^/ 
3 ; Q 3 l . 5~6 2«4eye*± 19 8S~ 
/)~-)j -o S i . O O T O T O . ( frvto</t<?cf b o t ^ o ac/<e<L vo(u>s •XVtT^*'* 
^ j ^ - / 3 . 4 6 ^ T«+<>~4«,)r i9&C 
S&j 7 1 f . <? A J"*? T<*.l n t e n * w Uipvisot+>e</ -flvs jTn-T-e^?' 
_„ ._3 , 4 ^ 6 , -Z~t> I j ^ v ^ j - 1 ^ 7 












I! /Yl 6~*l ,e44 ^ o f*v- o ot-s P C f ' " • _ i »-n 1 •**•*"*• ^ 
^cp /7.?.„3p.. . ..7>."W( r/i&73<>i k>°tvL9'-^"?<i p!"s -3«i-»vs>i 
. . 3 ; £ 'Q..6? 4 _ - „I>I:UK-*S+-...'? £8 . 
6.3, . y&7jL..JA . . To-fei...^G.t<i^ - bov^ ©*"«<* .f)u$ S^i^^i 
3>.&Z2,J2=& - -J..«.l^^J:--..±93:?. _. 
(0 P.J $> \. rLi .2:. ?= T o . f e l_..jtf<D.*?J?yt.„.hj?£€0^t.A _ Pi"$ . . J{A f **fsl 
A) o , ^ L . , ^ / ^ L ^ i ^ J l . J9J?£ 
.... .jdtt.. 3.g.<gLJ3- —- Zjai*£i£&jL ..JP-?L 
7 ^ 9 7-^., -46 To ' fed fr^on**, b ^ r ^ c ? ^ * ^ /^.s JV /T* *^ 7 
A-71 
GLEES' A . F I N X A Y S O N 
<r\rchitcclu2*al E n g i n e e r 
Utah Oil Rofinino Company 
UTAH OIL BUILDING 
S a l t L a k e C i t y l O , Uta lx 
DEFENDANT 
EXHIBIT 
S«f>4 . Q> , v<? 6 ^ 
*T £«3er- vJ f \ n (af s<3** pvo^riise 
G U*. A . P«aloc«jso^ o r ffync*. CAJ • P x n i o ^ i a ^ ( °° 
{_0*e. kv^^rtJ l i^c-f1) J o l l a v s y per « 4 * - M 4 U -f d v- <~e~+ 
o-f a. c U f / e * o . |
 9 7 5 - O/eiUl £ oaJ , S.L-C.,^^-
-tor- -|We a^oo^-i
 0£ 4 , ^ gogc*- OJ F m U ^ s ^ o^i 
P r o m i s e 4 0 p a L i ^ ^ o i«4-e»-e5l />&r i j o a r -Co*- e a c L 
<*^<i e ^ j * * ^ , ^ ^ P * ^ -f^e*-«- •>-£, +U*. | uud dv* 
4 U.«.y< O f o 
ss / $ j? a ' 






s/a„•(-,'*j Sep/-- / - / 9 6 ^ 
£ - * ^ / /90.~:_.„_f>j>.jr.__s72o.*t.£ci Q>->~. & ..•/to.?*-. f/"S . &??<?.... iff.Gnf.h 
...Piys- J?.<r^.i..t^zJ--.-JS./l-J:A-L.. /"Of'??..: -• -
£ £ £ cm 
l 16. &0 
2t 2. So. OQ_ 
............ A) c> 9 £ , So 
I 3z3±. & I 






/ • ^ « ' S 7 
_2 Y**fs £^J- *>L jZh±L. f-**,*s r I* 
1, 2~$QrOQ B *J taets £*<f 
7, ISS, £>( 
4 *>£. S~Z 
1, 6?4. ?5 
v-J 
y^c^S S'cit-erfS r 
>-d 
# eottss 
/£*+*/• />/<sj Si/<-*"'sf' 
J ^ 2. BO r CO 
*~^ 
4** $oulS fc^J-
9, 9 74./3 
Zztl-/l %8_ tC 5~7Z. S~3 
S98, 4s- +k y-oct «<5 j . Zrt r«s rs r 
^ 
y*>o>u S £**-*< r y/u^ 2*t f-?'"?* J 
• / ^ 2 , 2, So, op g~ ^ Vtaus £***,£ 
/ z , SS-2-. £~B 
• / H 7 7 / , / £~ £~ </patl^ -Pn Jfsf 
s*>p{-. i\ t? / 3 . 6Z5.~?4 S K y<*~* 
tgo. oo &*?* *yi&-~t ft* s ><?«*** f-




J0 </J?q.*' 1 1 site* es.f 
5* P^ A 7o M. b 42. & 
6 7 8 , 55- I 
EVjf^J .t* V ±S, 6~Z/. / / X-i-iV" Tt=73 
Co S.f/'.r: . 
0
 . Se/I" /fl?z 
,
—?«v»C. / • / 
7/ 
9 3 / , .27 





. J2 ^.43_%_S2._ 
Jt J/. 
£? Yjf—-$ 7f,?lJ.l^*si -. 
i0wf T*t T-e^+ffl . . . 1 . 
• / K J. 
9VA 
j? \fp#i*f X W r y?/u_j T.^..r^f'/'-s.r. 
/6 •ftx 
/S} 4*-&£~. 8 9 
/j /09, tS 
.-'/A*L </S JTe-r /scfsT 
/ 9 , S9<3~. Q4 / / yV/»*^ £>***/ if/iss' T*f/v**'g/ 
Iji / ~> £~. ~?Q /!• ^ ^ a ^ i Sc* ^*<-sf~ 
2*J?A''9W6 ^O . ~7~?Q,~?4 S2** ^*<yc2 7 ^ / 4 / , £ W / • /Is -Z-'A 
LJ^2I^L£LJ^L /3 At 
- ^ 
0€L<is5 ^/ */ 
S*/> A/fl ?? 2 - 2 . , £7 / ^ . ff <? / ^ * S<>AU<$ J?~*f / /gv^-f J^/eers/' 
/, $ . 2 / , OZ /f / t c J* OOtl^S Su fewest' 
A 
> * > _ > ^ / i p £ 2-3. 53 3r 0 / /* y***s j?~«/ /*/»$ S'*f/>+**sS-
/ , 4 <?£?, 3 - 8 /vT 
^ 
^ 
40t(s s j : * . , /**>**/-
.£££ / /d ti. 
/ .434. 3Q ft VK X oan^s «/"l« r^O'*s/~ 
S«S^ /fl&? Z2-6f 2- Z Z . £~9 Xp-fe^ / /l/uS £ nf**-^*/ 
/, S~? 3 . 36 /~? <-/e<sfs ZVr /eveST' 
**/•/?&/ z.*>: 7 is: 9s- O y<0o>*-s 4-+*if yp/<^s J?t*/<>*'**$ 7^ 
', 6C 7, 76 J* / ^ Y-•serfZ U*/*"'*^ 
>~*Sl / 4b? ^9. 46 8, 7/ /S™ A«- / /'/"<> Sit /offe^ 
/
 f 7 6 7 . 82 /9yh /e*rs r^/rc**/ 








S <*/>//9 90 
Sos* A 
33 /o-s~t_4.2. .?..£>_ .K-"^5- /rV?..^. /tlv* -*• *'.''?*<"*_?'/_ 
/,, ?<06, 3 3 P-/ _/^.^*-s ^_^vr/^*-v5/ 
"2. . JOS'/ j5~f ._„?.•?:...._.. v.-?*.?. -?V/xre"'.*'-T. . . 
. 3 7 , . (.?-!'~^:...^L ?. ?-.~"d ^f!*r?. ^.-w.A.... />(<?* -?» /^r*^1. 
2 / 2-3/. g ^ 1^3*d_..._^jvy*... .X*/W?^ 
s&LwP. 3 Sj.-'dL^JL/-^ i?"-i-. y ^ * * £*#£..... s/y.i ..-C".£«r-?sf:_„ 
...... „.._^„J.^LZCL_ a ^ M Y'O0t*'s -2~" ^ *"** ^~ 
•€fjf.Llti?... ^ 4 , 3 02.^4 2.S*1* i/s&fi? £-e^t/- fLs 3~«/**ss^ 
. ^ £ , 9 / 0 , 69} 2-6** ye **$ <€***/f 6s s 
2u-JL'7< 6 + 
v/ 
^ 1 ^ •o <*(•s JT*i rf^s/^ 
49. 7 7B. 3 3 a->^ yg^^g ^ ^ f />A/s J ^ / ^ ^ X 
"A^TF 
^ . ^ AUG 15 1978 (f^^oJ 
/ ^ ... , , , / t/Wul 
•315^016 ! • •' ----^*~-.l&*m ' 
WARRANTY DEED C't/ // (/ 
ROGER W. FINLAYSON, Trustee of the Mina W. Finlayson 
Revocable Trust, and MINA W. FINLAYSON, Settlor of the Mina W. 
Finlayson Revocable Trust, Grantors, of Salt Lake City, U;ah, 
hereby convey and warrant to ROGER W. FINLAYSON and ARVILLA K. 
! FINLAYSON, his wife, Grantees, of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, for the sum of Ten Dollars, and other good and valuable 
considerations, the following described tracts of land in Sa3t 
Lake County, Utah: 
Parcel 1: 
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Lot 80, Cotton-
wood Meadows A, B, and C, amended, and running thence 
South 87° 30f East 63.84 feet; thence South 57° 55' 
40" East 80.0 feet; thence South 48° 45f West 66.48 
feet; thence South 35° 07! 59" East 13.54 feet; 
thence South 51° West 27.70 feet; thence North 57° 
55' 40" West 116.42 feet; thence North 29° 15' East 
63.92 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel 2: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 82, Cotton- j 
wood Meadows A, B, and C, amended, a subdivision j 
located in the West Half of Section 9, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
and running thence North 35° 07' 59" West 13.54 
feet; thence North 48° 45* East 66.48 feel.; thence | 
South 57° 55* 40" East 14.05 feet; thence South 
48° 45 * West 71.96 feet to point of beginning. j 
Parcel 3: j 
Beginning at the most Northerly point of Lot 80, j 
Cottonwood Meadows A, B, and C, amended, Subdivision, j 
and running thence South 87° 30' East 63.84 feet to 
Highland Circle; thence North 57° 55' 40" West 57.08 ' 
feet along Highland Circle; thence South 29° 15f j 
West 31.54 feet to point of beginning. 
WITNESS the hands of said Grantors, this *^-'~ day o:: I 
, 1978. 
Koge/ W. Finlayson, Trustee of the 
Mina W. Finlayson Revocable Trust I 
. •->-.•
 y \ : i 
Mina W. Finlayson, "Settlor of the" ' 
Mina W. Finlayson Revocable Trust I 
ho 
to 
LAW O F F I C E S O F 
MOFFAT. W E L L I N G ft P A U L i E M 
A PKOrcttlONAL CORPORATION 
9TM FLOOR TRIBUNE BUILD ING 
143 SOUTH MAIN STREET 





STAidJ OF UTAH 




On the 4 J day of 
appeared before me ROGER W. FINLAYSON, 
Finlayson Revocable Trust, and MINA W. 
Mina W. Finlayson Revocable Trust, the signers of 
, 1978, personally 
Trustee of the Mina W. 
FINLAYSON, Set£loT~o-&<the 
n.rN within-. 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they yfe^piuttiepl t h e \ , 
same. 
\ nlwfft tAl i / i 
Notary Publ ic 
ss iding at S a l t Lake Ci\ 
* * * ; +-9f 
My Commission expires: 
\\-w-nn 
K3 
LAW erriet• OF 
MOFFAT. WCLUNO * PAULMWH 
A rnort••IOMAU CORPORATION 
OTH FLOOR rniUUHt »UILOfNO 
«41 SOUTH MAIN tTRCrr 





| EXHIBIT . . 
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3153016 !; - • •' — - ^ _ £ t f t o 
WARRANTY DEED ~ ^/, ^  ^ r " 
ROGER W. FINLAYSON, Trustee of the Mina W. Finlayson 
i Revocable Trust, and MINA W. FINLAYSON, Settlor of the Mina W. 
j Finlayson Revocable Trust, Grantors, of Salt Lake City, U ;ah, 
' hereby convey and warrant to ROGER W. FINLAYSON and ARVILLA K. 
FINLAYSON, his wife, Grantees, of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, for the sum of Ten Dollars, and other good and valuable 
considerations, the following described tracts of land in Salt | Lake County, Utah: 
Parcel 1: 
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Lot 80, Cotton-
wood Meadows A, B, and C, amended, and running thence 
South 87° 30' East 63.84 feet; thence South 57° 55' 
40" East 80.0 feet; thence South 48° 451 West 66.48 
feet; thence South 35° 07' 59w East 13.54 feet; 
thence South 51° West 27.70 feet; thence North 57° 
55' 40" West 116.42 feet; thence North 29° 15* East 
63.92 feet to the point of beginning. 
Parcel 3: 
A-w 
LAW OFFICC* or 
MOFFAT. WtLLINO ft PAUL1EM 
A PROrCIHONAt. COftPONATION 
»TM FLOOR TRIBUNE B U I L D I N G 
143 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
Parcel 2: I 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 82, Cotton-
wood Meadows A, B, and C, amended, a subdivision 
located in the West Half of Section 9, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base ctnd Meridian; 
and running thence North 35° 071 59" West 13.54 
feet; thence North 48° 45* East 66.48 feet.; thence 
South 57° 55" 40" East 14.05 feet; thence South 
48° 45* West 71.96 feet to point of beginning. 
I 
Beginning at the most Northerly point of Lot 80, | 
Cottonwood Meadows A, B, and C, amended, Subdivision, | 
and running thence South 87° 30! East 63.84 feet to 
Highland Circle; thence North 57° 55' 40" West 57.08 
feet along Highland Circle; thence South 29° 15! 
West 31.54 feet to point of beginning. 
WITNESS the hands of said Grantors, this -^- day o:f 
, 1978. 
•<? .'° 
Roger1 W. Finlayson, Trustee of the 
Mina W. Finlayson Revocable Trust 
^ • • • > : y \ -
Mina W. Finlayson, wSettlor of the " 





LAKE CITY. UTAH e<4 I U O ? 
-2-
STA13 OP UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the 4'^ day of /H'n'^ / , 1978, personally 
appeared before me ROGER W. FINLAYSON, Trustee of the Mina W. 
Finlayson Revocable Trust, and MINA W. FINLAYSOtf, Set^fcloT-crK^he 
Mina W. Finlayson Revocable Trust, the signers of th^ w^vithin-. J^N 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that theyy%^^£eS the'--,. \ 
same. 
|! UHW'4 t\M^AyxA 
fi 
Notary Public 
ss iding a t S a l t Lake C&&<2/tffcah 
My Commission expires: \^\ 
*\5 
LAW orrtct • or 
<• M O F F A T . W C L L I N O * P A U L * ™ 
A monitioNAL CORPORATION ^ jJ 
OTH FLOOR TRIBUNI BUILOINQ ^ * 
A «70 4 3 SOUTH MA,N 'T*c r f i 
^ ^ S V U T LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
Finlavson v. Finlayson 
Arvilla Roger 
House and real property at 
4950 Highland Circle including 
adjacent vacant lot— 
to be sold and net proceeds 
divided equally after adjustment 
for property settlement as 
provided below 1/2 1/2 
Automobiles: 
1987 Honda Accord 
(NADA Average trade-in) 6,300 
1987 Jeep Wagoneer 
(NADA Average trade-in) 9,425 
1975 Dodge Van 
(NADA Average trade-in) 1,175 
1978 Pace Arrow Motorhome 12,000 
(per appraisal) 
1980 Dune Buggy 1,000 
Motorcycles: 
1978 Honda 750cc 300 
1985 Honda 700cc 1,900 
1984 Honda 250cc 900 
1968 Honda 90cc (2) 50 50 
(Plaintiff requests one) 
1980 Honda 80cc 200 
1978 Honda 75cc 50 
23 ' Gulfstream boat 3,000 
90 shs. Pacific Corp. @24.25 
$2,182.50 2,182 
A-80 
Commonwealth Equity Trust USA 
Value $9,800 9,800 
Putnam Fund $2,600 2,600 
Cash removed by defendant from 
Zion's Bank account prior to 
parties1 division of account: 
9/11/90 $9,300 
9/12/90 9,000 18,300 
Life USA Policy (Roger) $30,000 1/2 1/2 
Life USA Policy (Arvilla) 1,000 
Camper World membership 6,000 
Coin collection 
(Plaintiff estimates values 
$15,000-30,000) 1/2 1/2 
Gun collection 15,500 
Power and hand tools 10,000 
"Precious moment11 doll collection 1,000 
Personal property—furniture, 
furnishings, etc. 1/2 1/2 
Commercial First Thrift 
proceeds divided equally 1/2 1/2 
VauLt $1,435 new 1,200 
Fireplace insert $1,149 600 
Utility trailer 900 
Cement mixer $750 new 375 
Riding lawn mower $1,500 new; 
one year old 1,000 
Riding lawn mower, 18 yrs old, 
rebuilt engine, working condition 400 
Motors—extensive collection of 
various types motors ? 
A-81 
Power edger $3 50 new 175 
Mulcher $830 new 
Snowblower $850 new 
Canoe, metal, 23 yrs old. 
(Plaintiff requests) 
TOTAL VALUES 
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT to plaintiff 
to equalize values to be paid 
from first proceeds of sale of 
home and/or lot; remaining 










SUMMARY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
ARVILLA FINLAYSON 
Attorney's fees 
Sharon A. Donovan, 25.6 hrs. @$100 
Shannon W. Clark, 34.35 hrs. @$75 
Kent M. Kasting, .3 hrs. @$125 







TOTAL COSTS (excluding trial) 
TOTAL ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
UNNECESSARY FEES INCURRED DUE TO DEFENDANT'S 
LACK OF COOPERATION AND CONTEMPT OF COURT ORDERS 
AND PURSUIT OF FRIVOLOUS CLAIM 











PREVIOUS RETAINER BALANCE 
1-30 Days: 31-60 Days: 61-90 Days: Over 90: Past Due: 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
PRIOR ACCOUNT HISTORY: 
Prior Charges: Prior Service: Prior Expense: Prior Payment: 
. $60.00 $80.00 $0.00 
Prior Hours: Prior Int.: Prior Tax: 




DATE PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED 
(SEE ATTACHED LIST) 






(SEE ATTACHED LIST) 





$ 1 , 0 5 5 . 8 5 ( 
$ 0 . 0 0 
$ 1 , 0 5 5 . 8 5 C 
REVIEW STATEMENT 








M E PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED INDIV TIME 
2-14-90 CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: WITHDRAWAL OF 
MONEY. SAD 0.30 $30.00 
2-19-90 CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT; DRAFT SUMMONS, 
COMPLAINT; BEGIN PREPARATION MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER. SWC 2.25 $168.75 
2-19-90 CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT. SAD 0.30 $30.00 
2-20-90 COMPLETE MOTION FOR RESTRAINING ORDER 
AND OTHER TEMPORARY ISSUES; MEETING WITH 
ARVILLA; OPEN TRUST ACCOUNT; REVIEW 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; CONFERENCE 
WITH SHARON DONOVAN TO DETERMINE SUPPORT 
AMOUNTS; TO COURT TO HAVE FILED - SIGNED 
BY JUDGE AND ISSUED. SWC 4.50 $337.50 
-20-90 CONFERENCE WITH SHANNON CLARK. SAD 0.30 $30.00 
-27-90 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT; PREPARE 
FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING; ATTEND 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING TO READ 
STIPULATION INTO RECORD. SWC 2.25 $168.75 
>-27-90 CONFERENCE WITH SHANNON CLARK. SAD 0.30 $30.00 
2-28-90 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH ARVILLA RE: 
TRISHA'S WHEREABOUTS; REVIEW ORDER 
SUBMITTED BY BILL RUSSELL. SWC 0.25 $18.75 
!-31-90 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: WEEKEND 
AND TRISHA'S WHEREABOUTS; ATTEMPTS TO 
PHONE BILL RUSSELL RE: SAME; LETTER TO 
RUSSELL RE: SAME. SWC 0.50 $37.50 
.TE EXPENSES 








PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED RECAP 
TIMEKEEPER EFFECTIVE RATE TIME 






Arvilla Finlayson DATE 01-25-91 
*Do not send to home* 
ACC'T NO. 1-SADFINL/ARV-1C 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED RECAP 
TIMEKEEPER EFFECTIVE RATE TIME CHARGE 
SWC $75.00 9.75 $731.25 




INTERNAL USE ONLY 
TO-BE-BILLED 
Arvilla Finlayson 
4950 Highland Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 ACC'T NO. 
DATE 03-22-91 
1-SADFINL/ARV-1C 
EVIOUS RETAINER BALANCE 
-30 Days: 31-60 Days: 61-90 Days: Over 90: 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Past Due: 
$0.00 
COR ACCOUNT HISTORY: 
Lor Charges: Prior Service: Prior Expense: Prior Payment: 







Prior Tax: Prior Cr.Adj.: 
$0.00 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED 
(SEE ATTACHED LIST) 
PAL FOR THE ABOVE SERVICES 
$ 2 0 . 0 0 
TIME 
9 . 6 0 
$ 1 2 1 . 9 5 C 
$ 7 3 5 . 0 0 
?E EXPENSES 
• 0 5 - 9 1 COPIES 
• 1 1 - 9 1 COPIES 
'AL FOR THE ABOVE EXPENSES 
$ 0 . 6 0 
$ 1 . 1 0 













4950 Highland Circle 








PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED 
91 INVENTORY AT CLIENT HOME. 
91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: 
PROPERTY AND MOVE; LETTER TO RUSSELL RE: 
SAME AND FOLLOW UP TO INVENTORY. 
-91 LETTER TO CLIENT RE: PROPERTY LIST FROM 
MR. FINLAYSEN AND ACCOUNTING. 
-91 CONFERENCE WITH SHARON DONOVAN; PHONE 
CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT; LETTER TO BILL 
CUSTODY EVALUATION AND RUSSELL RE: 
REALTOR. 
-91 CONFERENCE WITH SHANNON CLARK RE: 
CUSTODY EVALUATION. 
-91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH BILL RUSSELL RE: 
AGREEMENT ON EVALUATOR AND STATUS OF 
REALTOR; CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: 
DISCOVERY, CUSTODY EVALUATOR, REALTOR, 
VISITATION AND APPRAISAL; LETTER TO 
RUSSELL RE: SAME. 
>-26-91 CONFERENCE WITH SHARON DONOVAN RE: 
STRATEGY FOR DISCOVERY, SELLING OF 
HOUSE AND GETTING EVALUATION STARTED. 
1-26-91 CONFERENCE WITH SHANNON CLARK RE: STATUS 
OF CASE. 
1-27-91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: 
REALTOR, APPRAISOR AND VISITATION WITH 
TRISHA OVER WEEKEND. 
1-27-91 DICTATE INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. 
'-28-91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH RUSSELL RE: 
REALTOR; PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT 
CONFIRMING EAGER; CONFIRM WITH RUSSELL; 
LETTER TO RUSSELL RE: TAXES AND 





































SWC 0.50 $37.50 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED RECAP 

















INTERNAL USE ONLY 
TO-BE-BILLED 
Arvilla Finlayson 
4950 Highland Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 ACC'T NO. 
DATE 02-15-91 
1-SADFINL/ARV-1C 
PREVIOUS RETAINER BALANCE 
1-30 Days: 31-60 Days: 61-90 Days: Over 90: Past Due: 
$0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
PRIOR ACCOUNT HISTORY: 
"-ior Charges: Prior Service: Prior Expense: Prior Payment: 
J $1,004.15. $931.25 $92.90 $60.00 
Prior Hours: Prior Int.: Prior Tax: Prior Cr.Adj.: 
11.75 $0.00 $0.00 $20.00 
$1,055.85 C 
DATE PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED 
(SEE ATTACHED LIST) 




(SEE ATTACHED LIST) 












4950 Highland Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 ACC'T NO. 
DATE 02-15 
1-SADFINL/ARV 
DATE PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED INDIV TIME 
01-02-91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: 
COUNSELING FOR TRISHA; DEBT FROM KURT; 
PHONE CONFERENCE WITH BILL RUSSEL RE: 
WHERE TRISHA WILL BE STAYING. SWC 
91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: 
TRISHA'S WHEREABOUTS; BRIEFLY REVIEW 
DOCUMENTS FROM BILL RUSSEL; SEND TO 
CLIENT. 
91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH BILL RUSSEL AND 
CLIENT RE: TRISHA'S WHEREABOUTS AND 
KEEPING CLIENT INFORMED. 
91 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT TO 
FORMULATE RESPONSES TO AFFIDAVIT; 
DICTATE RESPONSE AFFIDAVIT. 
91 REVIEW AFFIDAVIT. 
91 MEET WITH CLIENT TO FINALIZE AFFIDAVIT; 
REVIEW AND ADD LETTER FROM DOROTHY 
EVANS; PREPARE FOR HEARING. 
91 ATTEND AND ARGUE HEARING ON TEMPORARY 
MATTERS, INCLUDING CUSTODY AND 
POSSESSION OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE. 
91 CONFERENCE WITH SHANNON CLARK RE: 
CUSTODY EVALUATION AND SELECTION OF 
LISTING AGENT FOR SALE OF MARITAL 
RESIDENCE. 
91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: FOLLOW 
UP QUESTIONS AFTER THE HEARING. 
91 TWO PHONE CONFERENCES WITH PUELER'S 
CLERK RE: INTERVIEW TRISHA AND LORI; 
PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: SAME. 
91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: BREAK 
IN; PHONE CONFERENCE WITH BILL RUSSEL; 
LETTER RE: SAME. 
91 REVIEW RECOMMENDATION; PHONE CONFERENCE 
WITH CLIENT; LETTER TO CLIENT RE: SAME; 
PHONE CONFERENCE WITH BILL RUSSEL RE: 
INVENTORY AND RECOMMENDATION; PHONE 
CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: SAME. SWC 
01-24-91 CONFERENCE WITH SHANNON CLARK RE: 
DECISION. SAD 
-25-91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH BILL RUSSEL RE: 




















































4950 Highland Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
T^E PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED 
WITH CLIENT RE: SAME. 
L-29-91 REVIEW STIPULATION AND COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATION; CALL BILL RUSSEL RE: 
SAME; PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: 
SAME. 


















.-04-91 SERVICE FEE - SUMMONS & COMPLAINT 
.-04-91 COPIES 
.-04-91 SERVICE FEE - TRO & ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 













PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED RECAP 
TIMEKEEPER EFFECTIVE RATE TIME 
















SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901) 
SHANNON W. CLARK (5678) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main Street, Suite 13 3 0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
'.Jv.,,' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 







PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FINDING 
IN RE: CONTEMPT, FOR ORDER 
COMPELLING COMPLIANCE WITH COURT 
ORDERS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil NO. D90-5062 
Honorable Timothy R. Hansen 
•oOo-
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Arvilla Finlayson, after being 
first duly sworn upon oath, and deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled matter. 
2. I have personal knowledge concerning the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the matters set forth below. 
3. I am the ex-wife of Roger Finlayson. Our divorce 
was tried before the above-entitled Court on October 17 and 18, 
A92 0017 
1991. At that time, defendant and I stipulated to a number of 
matters, and the Court ruled on the remainder of the issues 
relating to the divorce. 
4. In March of 1991, over a year ago, defendant and I 
stipulated that the marital residence should be immediately listed 
for sale. In addition, as a result of the divorce trial, the Court 
ordered that the marital residence be sold as soon as possible. 
Both before and after the divorce trial, defendant has been 
uncooperative with the then listing agent of Eager & Company. 
Accordingly, I have been speaking with different realtors and have 
signed a listing agreement with Miller & Company. Defendant has 
not been willing to cooperate in signing the listing agreement or 
in even speaking with the realtor on the telephone, in order to 
make the necessary arrangements to enter into the listing agreement 
and eventually show the home to potential buyers. 
5. The agent I have listed with is Mr. Rudy Valley. He 
has informed me that he has made 10 to 15 attempts to contact 
defendant in person or by phone to get him to sign the listing 
agreement. On numerous occasions, he has been told by the minor 
child in defendant's custody that defendant is unavailable or not 
at home. 
6. At the divorce trial, the Court ordered defendant to 
make necessary repairs on the home to facilitate its sale. I 
believe that the defendant has not made the necessary repairs and, 
in fact, holes still remain in the kitchen floor. 
2 
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7. The marital residence is the primary asset of the 
marital estate and I am in dire need of the proceeds from the sale. 
Nonetheless, over a year after the original Order to sell the home, 
defendant continues to refuse make the necessary repairs to the 
home or to even enter into a listing agreement• 
8. Pursuant to the Order of the Court, defendant and I 
were each awarded a vehicle. However, the defendant refuses to 
transfer to the me the title to my Honda and also the motor home I 
was awarded. 
9. I have made the above requests of defendant numerous 
times, and my attorney has also made these requests through 
defendant's attorney with no response. See letter attached as 
Exhibit "A". 
10. Although defendant has been residing in the 
mortgage-free marital residence for approximately one year, he 
refuses to be responsible for the property taxes that have accrued 
over this period of time. I have been forced to reside in various 
apartments and have paid the rents associated therewith with no 
assistance from defendant. It is reasonable and proper that 
defendant be ordered to immediately pay all property tax on the 
marital residence which became due in November of 1991. 
11. Defendant had possession of the Camperworld 
membership during 1991. There is an annual fee associated with 
this membership of approximately $200.00 per year. I was awarded 
the camperworld membership at trial. I would like to be able to 
sell the membership, however, defendant has not paid the 1991 fee 
3 
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and therefore I am unable to sell it until that is done. It is 
fair and reasonable to require defendant to pay the membership fee 
for the time period he had possession and transfer it to me so I 
may sell it. 
12. Pursuant to the Order of the Court, defendant and I 
were ordered to select a family counselor to work with our minor 
child in counseling sessions. We were ordered to cooperate, 
schedule the sessions and each ordered to pay one-half. In a 
letter to defendant's counsel dated February 10, 1992, (attached) 
I suggested two names as counselors for Tricia. Since that time, 
I have received no response from defendant regarding commencement 
of these counseling sessions, and it is fair and proper for the 
Court to order defendant to cooperate in all respects in beginning 
Tricia1s counseling sessions as soon as possible. 
13. Pursuant to a stipulation, we agreed to divide the 
marital personal property by going from room to room in the marital 
residence and alternating selections. This has been a very time-
consuming project. For the first several sessions, both defendant 
and I had our attorneys present to facilitate the arrangement. 
Since then, however, defendant and I have attempted to divide the 
personal property on our own. I have had a very difficult time 
reaching an agreement with the defendant on times that we could 
both meet at the home and complete the division of the personal 
property. It is my belief that defendant is purposefully 
sabotaging the division of property by not allowing me to come back 
in the home, by not returning my telephone calls, by not answering 
4 
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the telephone and by refusing to allow me into the house even at 
time that have been previously agreed upon by defendant and myself 
and our counsel. 
14. As an example of the difficultly I have had in 
dividing the personal property, I was awarded the 9 drawer dresser 
we had in our bedroom. All drawers were present until I made 
arrangements to take it out of the home at which time one drawer 
disappeared. Defendant claims he has no knowledge of the missing 
drawers whereabouts. In addition, defendant and I and both our 
attorneys inventoried the contents of the home in Winter 1991. 
Extensive lists of all the personal property were created. Since 
that time numerous items on the inventory are missing and defendant 
claims to have no information about their whereabouts. An example 
of the missing items is as follows: numerous brand new plush toys, 
camping supplies, chain saw, record player, family photographs and 
numerous other items. It is my belief that defendant is 
purposefully hiding this property from me. 
15. I ask the Court to order defendant to participate in 
the completion of the division of personal property by specifically 
ordering defendant to cooperate in setting up several times that 
are mutually convenient when I may go into the marital residence 
and work with defendant in dividing property. It would be fair and 
proper for the order to require defendant to continue to cooperate 
until such time as both he and I are satisfied that all personal 
property in the marital residence has been divided. 
5 
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16. Defendant and I were ordered to divide the stock 
acquired during the marriage equally. I have had the investment 
company send the documents necessary for division of the stock 
certificates directly to defendant. Defendant has refused to 
execute such agreements, and it is fair and proper that the Court 
order him to do so. 
17. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, I was awarded the 
marital motor home. The motor home was stored at the marital 
residence. It was inside a locked fence. The vehicle and the gas 
tanks itself were locked, and only defendant had access to the 
keys. Shortly after the divorce trial, I went to the marital 
residence to pick up the motor home, at which time I discovered 
that sugar had been put into the motor home's gas tanks. Sugar 
crystals could be seen around the opening of the tank, and the 
sugar itself could be tasted and smelled. It is my belief that 
defendant is responsible for sabotaging the vehicle, and it would 
be fair and equitable for the Court to order him to make such 
repairs as would be necessary to put the vehicle in good working 
order so I may remove it from the residence and do with it what I 
would like. 
18. I have had to bring this Motion to address the 
numerous Orders of the Court with which defendant refused to 
comply. As outlined above, defendant has engaged in a pattern of 
consistent refusal to obey Court Orders both before and after the 
Divorce was finalized. Further, I was awarded the nominal amount 
of $500.00 in attorney's fees at trial. As a result of defendant's 
6 
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action and inaction, I have incurred attorney's fees and costs in 
bringing this Motion, and it would be fair and reasonable to Order 
him to pay iay fees and costs in the amount of $1,000.00. 
DATED this 2/b day of March, 1992. 
LMf?l/J&i 7 <-h~tJuU,^ur 
ARVILLA FlfltAYSON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary 
Public, this /^p?^day of March, 1992. 
IjjjvMJtrwQculg-
NOTARY PUBLIC 
[ S E A L ] 
1
 — ^ ^ Notary Put:'- , 
IRENE M. CLARK 1 
310 South Mnin St. #130 | 
State of Utah , 
— ™ — — CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
srix I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the ^ ( Q day 
of March, 1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Plaintiff's Affidavit in Support of Motion for Finding in Re: 
Contempt and for Order Compelling Compliance with Court Orders was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
William R. Russell, Esq. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 213 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
• n/Yxi)fYYflg;di)f 
IRENE M. CLARK 
A-98 00180 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
T
 hereby certify that foi ir true and correct copies r. MP 
above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT -.iu !y hand delivered,, 
addressed to: 
William R. Russell, Esq. 
8 East Broadway, Suit e 213 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED this %_ _ _ day of December, 1992 
K _ \ ^ <x.-/^ -A--'V ^ -A. 
